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Resumo 
A indústria automóvel tem vindo ao longo dos anos a sofrer uma evolução exponencial. Os 
veículos modernos estão cada vez mais a ser dotados de funcionalidades que providenciam 
uma maior segurança, conforto, eficiência e performance. Estas funcionalidades são baseadas 
não só em sistemas computacionais isolados, mas resultam também da interacção entre vários 
sistemas, que são suportados por várias redes de comunicação de dados com requisitos e 
aplicações distintas. 
À medida que os componentes mecânicos têm vindo a ser substituidos por equivalentes 
electrónicos, são exigidos a estes níveis de confiança elevados no seu funcionamento, que 
podem apenas ser atingidos com o recurso a técnicas de concepção de arquitecturas 
tolerantes a falhas. 
Este trabalho apresenta uma visão geral de várias funcionalidades que podem ser 
encontradas nos veículos modernos, das arquitecturas e redes de comunicação que suportam 
o seu funcionamento, e de algumas das técnicas de concepção que permitem aumentar a 
confiança que pode ser depositada no funcionamento destes sistemas. Por fim, é apresentada 
uma proposta para uma arquitectura de um sistema de travagem com requisitos de segurança 
crítica. 
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Abstract 
The automotive industry has been evolving over the years in an exponential fashion. 
Modern vehicles are increasingly being provided with features which provide greater security, 
comfort, safety and performance. These features are not only based in isolated 
computational systems, but also result from the interaction between various systems, which 
are supported by several data communication networks with distinct requirements and 
applications. 
As mechanical components are being replaced by their equivalent electronic, higher 
levels of dependability are being demanded from these, which can only be attained by means 
of fault tolerant design techniques. 
This work presents an overview of the various features that can be found on modern 
vehicles, the architectures and communication networks that support their operation, and 
some of the design techniques which allow an increase of their dependability. Finally, a 
proposal for the architecture of a braking system with safety critical requirements is 
presented. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1  Motivation 
Recent environmental concerns allied to a decrease in the available sources of fossil fuel 
are leading vehicle manufacturers to invest on the development of alternative transportation 
methods. The use of electrical energy on vehicles is promising, since it can be obtained in a 
more efficient way with a lower impact on the environment [1].  
Even when the energy which supplies electric vehicles (EVs) is obtained by means of 
polluting fuel sources such as coal, crude or oil, the efficiency provided by electric vehicle 
powertrains results in cleaner ecological footprints when comparing to internal combustion 
engine (ICE) vehicles [2, 3]. The future is even brighter, as efforts are widely being put 
together to convert carbon emitting power stations into clean renewable sources of energy, 
motivated by European Union targets of having at least 20% of the energy consumed coming 
from renewable resources until the year of 2020 [4]. 
It has been demonstrated that the acceleration, speed and handling of electric vehicles 
can equal or exceed that of ICE vehicles [5]. Moreover, electric vehicles produce less noise 
and emit zero tailpipe gases, making them the appropriate choice for use in urban 
transportation. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Tesla roadster, a fully electric sports vehicle   
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The department of electrical and computer engineering (DEEC) at the Faculty of 
Engineering of the University of Porto (FEUP) has just finished building a new laboratory 
which will host the development of many projects related with EVs. This new infrastructure 
will allow students to develop solutions related to EVs along their academic career.  
Several features which provide greater safety, comfort, efficiency and performance, are 
being increasingly integrated in modern vehicles. The information about such features, their 
hardware architectures, the communication networks that support their operation, and the 
techniques used by manufacturers to provide them with the required dependability levels, is 
significantly widespread.  
The agglomeration of such information on a single document will allow students to easily 
move for the actual implementation of these features. 
1.2  Objectives 
Two main objectives have been defined for this thesis. The first objective is the 
elaboration of a survey covering: 
 
 The various features that are commonly found on modern vehicles, their general 
concepts of operation, and the hardware architectures which support their 
behavior  
  The networking solutions used in the automotive industry which support the 
behavior of the identified features 
 
The second objective of this work is the proposal of a conceptual architecture for the 
braking system whose implementation can be achieved taking in consideration: 
 
 The background obtained by students along their academic career 
 The feasibility of the braking system by the students 
 The availability and cost of the components that will support the proposed 
architecture 
 The aspects of dependability in which a braking system much rely on 
1.3  Document Structure 
This document is divided into 6 chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 presents the motivation behind this work and the objectives that have been 
defined. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview on the systems that are commonly found in modern vehicles, 
their major requirements, and a closer look on the systems which are considered to be a 
priority for the development of projects within the context of the new automotive laboratory.  
 
Chapter 3 addresses the networking solutions which are used to interconnect the systems 
referred in Chapter 2. Controller area network (CAN), local interconnect network (LIN) and 
Flexray are presented due to their actual importance in the automotive industry. TTEthernet 
is presented as a promising solution for future vehicles.   
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Chapter 4 presents the emerging concept of by-wire systems applied to the automotive 
industry. Several techniques and ideas that can be used by students to increase the 
dependability of their systems are introduced in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the proposed hardware architecture for the braking system architecture 
and the algorithms which support its dependability. 
 
Chapter 6 overviews all of the work that has been done and future work. 
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Chapter 2  
In-Vehicle systems 
2.1  Introduction 
The first part of this chapter starts with an overview of the different systems that can be 
usually found on vehicles. Afterwards, several of these systems which are considered to be a 
priority for the development of the EV project are explored with further detail. 
2.2  Automotive Systems 
The various subsystems that compose a vehicle can be classified into several domains 
according to their functionalities. The number and name of these domains varies along the 
literature [6, 7]. In this section, seven domains are considered and an overview of typical 
systems and requirements is presented.  
2.2.1  Powertrain 
The powertrain enclosures the systems that are responsible for converting power into the 
motion of the vehicle. Examples of systems in the powertrain domain are 
 
 the propulsion system controller  which has the task of controlling the propulsion 
device (which can be an electric motor or an internal combustion engine) 
according to the driver's inputs and requests from other systems, such as the 
electronic stability control, traction control system or adaptive cruise control. 
 automatic transmission controllers 
 battery management systems 
 
Systems belonging to this domain are characterized by: 
 
 High computational power to deal with the complex algorithms that support the 
control of the propulsion and transmission devices 
 Low sampling/actuation times to allow for smooth control 
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 Hard real-time requirements  
2.2.2  Chassis  
The chassis domain integrates the systems responsible for the interaction between the 
vehicle and the road [6]. This domain includes braking, steering and suspension systems. 
Examples of systems in the chassis domain are 
 
 Power steering which monitors the driver's steering intentions and provides an 
assisting force in steering the vehicle 
 Antilock braking system (ABS) for wheel lock-up prevention upon braking 
 Electronic Stability Control (ESC) to prevent the vehicle from skidding 
 Traction Control System (TSC) in order to control vehicle traction when 
accelerating  
 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) to enhance comfort by the autonomous control of 
the distance or headway time to front vehicles 
 Electronic Damper Control (EDC) to control the vertical movement of the wheels 
 
Systems which belong to this domain are characterized by having: 
 
 High computational power 
 High sampling/actuation rates 
 Hard real-time requirements 
 Fail safe constraints which allow these systems to fail in a safe way 
 Fault tolerance in the case of x-by-wire and steer-by-wire systems 
2.2.3  Body  
The body domain comprises systems that do not interfere with the vehicle dynamics. 
Examples of systems belonging to the body domain are 
 
 interior and exterior lighting systems 
 air conditioning systems which control the temperature of the cockpit 
 vehicle access systems which ease the access to the vehicle and provide security 
 seat control systems which provide more comfort 
 park distance control which monitors the distance to obstacles to aid the driver 
when parking the vehicle 
 
Systems belonging to this domain are typically characterized by having: 
 
 Low computational power 
 Low sampling/actuation rates as events are mostly triggered by human interaction 
 Soft real-time requirements 
 
It must be noted, however, that lighting systems are evolving in a way in which they do 
not share the computational requirements with other systems from the body domain. Several 
lighting systems whose requirements are most approximated with the powertrain and chassis 
requirements are presented in Section 2.6.  
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2.2.4  Passive Safety 
Passive safety systems operate in order to reduce the effects of a crash. Examples of 
systems belonging to this domain are:  
 
 Airbag systems which deploy inflatable envelops upon impact according to the 
type (front impact, lateral impact) and severity of impact, with the intention of 
reducing shocks applied to the driver 
 Seat belt pretensioners which maintain the driver in a steady position during 
crashes and sudden vehicle movements  
 
Systems belonging to this domain are typically characterized by having: 
 
 High computational power 
 High sampling/actuation rates 
 Hard real-time requirements 
 Fail safe constraints 
2.2.5  Human-Machine-Interfaces (HMI) 
HMI systems provide the interaction between the driver and the vehicle. Examples of 
systems belonging to this domain are: 
 
 Instrument panels which provide information on the status of many of the vehicle 
variables of interest such as speed, rpm, fuel level among others 
 Tire pressure management systems which monitor tire pressure and informs the 
driver of possible dangerous situations  
 
Systems belonging to this domain are typically characterized by having: 
 
 Low to high computational power depending on the complexity of the display 
systems 
 Medium sampling/actuation times, congruent with human perception 
 Soft real time requirements 
2.2.6  Infotainment and Telematics 
  Infotainment and telematics systems provide information, entertainment and the 
interaction between the vehicle and the exterior world. Examples of systems belonging to this 
domain are: 
 
 Global positioning systems that provide the driver with information on its 
location, direction and speed 
 Audio Systems 
 DVD Players 
 Fleet management systems which allows the tracking of vehicles 
 Vehicle internet connection 
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Systems belonging to this domain are typically characterized by having: 
 
 Very high computational power 
 Soft real-time requirements 
2.3  Braking Systems 
This section presents an overview of the features and architectures of braking systems.  
Braking systems are safety critical on their nature. This means that the failure of these 
systems to perform their expected operations can result in a catastrophic event, such as the 
damage of the vehicle and ultimately the injury or dead of people and environmental harm. 
The architectures of braking systems are therefore conceived taking in consideration the 
required dependability for their operation. Throughout this section, these systems are 
presented without the consideration of these issues as general references for the 
development of safety critical systems are given Chapter 4. 
The architectures presented in this chapter may reflect slight adaptations from the 
studied systems. Therefore, several details that do not contribute for the understanding or 
the concepts involved were omitted.  
2.3.1  Antilock Braking System (ABS) 
According to [8], the ABS system reduces fatal collisions with pedestrians in thirteen 
percent and achieves a twelve percent reduction in collisions between vehicles on wet roads. 
The ABS was proven to grant more efficiency in nonfatal crashes, reducing the overall crash 
rate by six percent for passenger cars and eight percent for light trucks and vans. 
The ABS is a safety-related feature that assists the driver in deceleration of the vehicle in 
poor or marginal braking conditions, such as wet, icy or sandy pavements [9].  
When the driver presses the brake pedal, a force is generated on the wheels which 
counteracts its motion. Depending on the surface in which the wheels are spinning, this 
braking force can achieve a value that can cause the wheels to slip.  
The relationship between the vehicle speed and the slip of the wheel is denominated 
brake slip and is defined as the ratio between the speed of the wheel and the speed of the 
vehicle itself 
 
 
𝜆 =
𝑆𝑣𝑒𝑕𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 − 𝑆𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙
𝑆𝑣𝑒𝑕𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
× 100% 
 
𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
 
𝜆: 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑝 
𝑆𝑣𝑒𝑕𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 : 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑕𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑) 
𝑆𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 : 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 (𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑) 
 
(2.1) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the wheel slip and the adhesion coefficient 
of the wheels for several surfaces. The higher the adhesion coefficient is, the more braking 
force is effectively used to reduce vehicle speed and consequently its stopping distance.  
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Disregarding snowy surfaces, it can be denoted that the adhesion coefficient reaches its 
maximum value, and after decreases with the increase of wheel slip. It can be concluded that 
the higher the wheel slip is, the higher the stopping distance of a vehicle will be. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Relationship between the adhesion coefficient and wheel slip in different road conditions 
[10].   
 
The lateral friction is what enables the vehicle to steer [10]. Its value is also dependent 
on wheel slip, as illustrated by Figure 2.2. It can be seen that as the wheel slip ratio 
increases, the lateral friction coefficient decreases and so the vehicle maneuverability.  
The chart on Figure 2.2 depicts two distinct zones in respect to wheel slip: the stable and 
the unstable zone. The stable zone ends where the maximum value of the friction coefficient 
is reached. The unstable zone is characterized by a rapid deceleration of wheel speed, that 
leads to wheel lock-up, corresponding to the minimum lateral friction coefficient. At this 
point, wheels are completely blocked and the vehicle maneuverability is drastically reduced. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 - Relationship between brake slip, lateral force coefficient, and coefficient of friction [11] 
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2.3.1.1  ABS Operation 
The objective of the ABS system is to ensure that the brakes operate near their most 
efficient point, therefore granting steering control at all times and shorter stopping distances 
[12]. This is achieved by controlling wheel slip so that its value is kept below the unstable 
zone. Wheel slip is controlled by controlling the force applied to the brakes. 
The ABS constantly monitors wheel speed for situations that might indicate wheel slip 
approaching the unstable zone. If such situation is detected, the brake force applied is 
prevented to be raised any further. In case that the wheel slip steps into the unstable zone, 
the ABS reduces brake force so wheel slip is taken back into the stable zone. To avoid under 
braking and maximize braking efficiency, the brake force is then increased and the process 
repeats itself. 
An example of the braking force modeled by the ABS against the braking force that would 
be applied without ABS is illustrated on Figure 2.3. In red it can be seen the driver’s braking 
intension while at blue the actual brake intensity performed by the ABS system on one of the 
wheels in order to prevent lock-up.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - ABS preventing wheel lock-up 
2.3.1.2  Types of ABS 
According to the number of wheels whose braking is individually controlled, the ABS can 
be implemented in four main distinct ways. The number of control channels on the ABS refers 
to the number of wheels that are individually controlled. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 - Symbolic Nomenclature 
Single Channel ABS 
The single channel ABS is the most simple and inexpensive type of ABS. It consists on a 
ABS controller, a sensor that is placed on the differential or axle of rear wheels and an 
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actuator controlling brake force in both rear wheels at the same time. No front wheel slip is 
detected and rear wheel slip is only detected when both wheels are slipping.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - One channel ABS 
 
Two Channel ABS 
The different configurations of two channel ABS are organized below in Figure 2.6.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 - Different arrangements for two channel ABS systems. Front wheels facing down 
 
 A: The brake force applied to both front wheels corresponds to the brake force 
required for achieving the highest possible friction coefficient on any of the wheels.  
Therefore, one of the front wheels may block and rear wheels are only controlled 
when both lock-up 
 B: One rear and one front wheel is monitored. The applied braking force ensures that 
the sensed wheels do not block 
 C: Both of the front wheels are sensed separately and the braking force is applied 
diagonally  
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Three Channel ABS 
On three channel ABS both front wheels are sensed individually while rear wheels are sensed 
in the differential/rear wheel axle.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 - Three channel ABS configuration 
Four channel ABS 
Four channel ABS systems are found in most modern vehicles nowadays. In this system, all 
of the wheels are sensed and controlled by a dedicated control channel thus granting the 
maximum possible controllability and enabling the implementation of other features. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 - Four channel ABS system 
2.3.1.3  ABS Architecture 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the main blocks that compose an antilock braking system. 
The ABS actuates when the driver presses the brake pedal. Hence it requires the 
knowledge of the state of the brake pedal. A brake switch connected to the microcontroller 
unit (MCU) serves this purpose. 
Signal conditioning circuits are required whenever the range or type of sensors are not 
suited to the inputs of the microcontroller unit (MCU). This is usually required when the 
outputs of wheel speed sensors are not in the form of PWM signals, which can be interpreted 
directly by the MCU. 
Whenever the antilock braking system intervenes, the driver must be notified that a 
potentially dangerous situation has occurred. Furthermore, the ABS must perform self 
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diagnostics in order to detect faulty units. The network interface serves these purposes, 
interconnecting the ABS with the systems that perform driver notification. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 - Architecture of the Antilock Braking System 
 
Figure 2.10 depicts an alternative architecture for the ABS. All sensor acquisition circuitry 
are placed in a application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). A dedicated microcontroller 
computes sensor values and, through a network interface such as CAN or Flexray (discussed in 
Chapter 3) delivers the state of all variables of interest. This enables relieving the main ABS 
MCU processing requirements. The ASIC can be provided with safety related mechanisms such 
as temperature sensors, watchdog timers and other safety related devices, so more 
dependability and computational relief of the ABS is achieved. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 - Architecture of the Antilock Braking System with an ASIC for sensor processing and 
distribution 
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2.3.2  Traction Control System (TCS) 
When starting off on low frictional coefficient surfaces, excessive throttle can cause the 
driving wheels to slip, making it harder or even impossible for the driver to move the vehicle. 
This situation frequently happens when vehicles start off on icy or wet pavements, as the 
required throttle to move the vehicle is lesser than the driver with its inputs can perform. 
A single drive wheel standing in a low frictional surface is enough to immobilize a vehicle. 
This is due to the physical properties of the differential gear, the mechanical component that 
enables torque to be delivered to driving wheels spinning at different speeds. When the 
wheel which is standing on the low friction surface starts slipping, its torque is zero, which 
will induce a zero torque on the other wheel coupled to the differential. This causes the 
vehicle to be immobilized.  
 
 
Figure 2.11 - Vehicle in a split friction coefficient surface 
 
The TCS prevents wheels from spinning due to excess throttle. It improves forward 
traction and vehicle stability [13] and is specially required for preventing the situations 
mentioned above. 
TCS can be thought as being the dual of the ABS. The TCS stands for acceleration as ABS 
stands for braking and therefore, while the ABS limits braking force, the TCS limits 
acceleration. The chart on Figure 2.12 illustrates the duality between the TCS and the ABS. 
Analogously to what was described when discussing the ABS, stable and unstable values of 
wheel slip during acceleration exist. When wheel slip during acceleration reaches the 
unstable zone, the affected wheel experiences a rapid acceleration, and a consequently 
lower friction coefficient. 
The computational unit controlling the TCS monitors wheel speeds during acceleration. 
Upon detection of a wheel that is spinning or accelerating faster than the others, the TCS 
enables corrective actions by braking the wheel and requesting for a torque reduction to the 
motor control unit, so that wheel slip is maintained at all times in the stable zone of the 
friction/wheel slip chart. 
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Figure 2.12 - Duality between ABS and TCS [11].  
 
In vehicles equipped with electronic throttle control (ETC), torque reduction is achieved 
by controlling the throttle electronically. In internal combustion engine vehicles which are 
not equipped with ETC, torque reduction is achieved by means of reducing/suppressing the 
spark of one or more cylinders.   
As the TCS main composing blocks and principles are shared with the ABS, generally both 
units operate in the same electronic control unit (ECU). 
2.3.3  Electronic Stability Control (ESC) 
The electronic stability control (ESC) is an active safety system developed by Bosch in the 
90’s and, according to [14], it is extremely successful in reducing not only fatal crashes but 
also other crash involvements. The United States National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration issued a report pointing a reduction in 35% in passenger car accidents and 67% 
reduction in SUV accidents, both for single car accidents [14]. This crash reduction rate in 
vehicles equipped with the ESC, made it that every new automobile sold in the United States 
from 2012 on will have ESC mandatorily.  
In optimal conditions where no wheel slip is observed, when a driver steers a vehicle a 
yaw momentum is generated. This yaw momentum is responsible for the change in the vehicle 
direction. However, when the vehicle is skidding, i.e. its direction is not congruent with the 
wheels direction, the generated yaw is diminished and consequently the steering effect. This 
may result in loss of the vehicle control by the driver. 
The slip angle is a measure of the amount of skidding a vehicle is experiencing. Figure 
2.13 depicts a skidding vehicle in which the slip angle β can be observed. 
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Figure 2.13 - Vehicle side slip angle 
The relationship between the yaw moment and the slip angle for a set of steering 
angles varying from -4 to +4 is given on the chart on Figure 2.14.  
It can be noticed that the greater the slip angle is, the less effect a steering action by 
the driver will be actually turned into the pretended steering effect. Also, two different 
situations can happen: when the required yaw moment is bigger than the actual yaw moment 
(understeering) and when the required yaw moment is smaller than the actual needed 
(oversteering). These situations are depicted in Figure 2.15. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14 - Relationship between the yaw moment and the side slip angle [11]  
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Figure 2.15 - Vehicle experiencing under and over steering 
The objective of the ESC system is to guarantee that the driver steering intentions are 
actually performed by the vehicle. 
 
2.3.3.1  ESC Operation 
Firstly through vehicle dynamics calculations, the ESC must determine how the vehicle 
should be behaving with the driver’s inputs. These are the steering wheel angle, the brake 
pedal pressure and the throttle position.  
The vehicle's ideal behavior is then compared with its actual behavior. The actual 
behavior of the vehicle is obtained with aid of yaw moment sensors, lateral acceleration 
sensors and wheel speed sensors. If the actual behavior of the vehicle differs from the ideal 
behavior by a certain amount, called the threshold, the ESC kicks in by sending commands to 
the motor control ECU and to the brake actuators so a counteracting yaw that compensates 
the skidding effect is generated.  
In case of oversteering and understeering situations, the brake forces applied to 
stabilize the vehicle are as high as the deviation between the ideal and the actual behavior of 
the vehicle. 
Figure 2.16 illustrates an oversteering situation. As the vehicle direction starts pointing 
to the center of the curve, the ESC system detects the discrepancy between the driver inputs 
and the vehicle behavior and tries to minimize it by applying a counteracting yaw moment. 
This counteracting yaw moment is achieved by applying brake pressure on the right front 
wheel. As expected, if this discrepancy raises, so the counteracting yaw must raise and 
therefore the brake pressure is increased on sequence 3. As the vehicle goes back to the 
desired direction, the brake pressure on the right front wheel is progressively decreased until 
the vehicle behavior corresponds to the driver inputs. 
 
 
  
18 In-Vehicle systems 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 - ESC operation during over steering 
Figure 2.17 depicts an understeering situation. Despite the driver's intention to steer the 
vehicle, the vehicle doesn’t respond in the way it should and it starts moving towards the 
outer part of the curve. Once the ESC detects this behavior it tries to compensate by creating 
a counteracting yaw by applying brake pressure on the rear left wheel. Just like in the 
previous example this force is as big as the difference between the actual behavior and the 
desired.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.17 - ESC operation during understeering 
2.3.3.2  ESC Architecture 
Figure 2.18 illustrates a possible architecture for an ESC system. Due to the fact that the 
value of lateral acceleration and yaw sensors can be required by other systems, these might 
be placed on a dedicated ASIC embedding all the requiring components for their acquisition. 
Being dependent on other systems for its operation, the ESC is connected to the required 
systems by means of a network interface. The steering wheel position value is often 
transmitted by the power steering ECU.   
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Figure 2.18 - Electronic Stability Control architecture 
2.3.4  Electronic Brake Force Distribution (EBD)  
EBD allows vehicles to stop in shorter distances by distributing brake force according to 
the distribution of weight among the vehicle [15]. 
Due to the fact that weight is not evenly distributed in vehicles, each wheel supports a 
different load. The load that a wheel has to support is also dependent on the dynamics of the 
vehicle. When braking in a straight line the weight shifts from the rear to the front of the 
vehicle while when braking during turns the weight is shifted to the outer part of the vehicle 
in relation to the turn. The more weight a wheel is supporting, the better grip it has and 
therefore the more braking force can be applied to it. The EBD takes advantage of this 
physical fact. 
The EBD adjusts the ratio between front/rear or left/right brake forces so the braking 
effect is maximized. Wheel speeds are constantly monitored and, upon detection of wheel 
slip due to low load, brake force is increased on higher loaded wheels. 
The EBD can be seen as an upgrade of the ABS system as it uses the same components and 
therefore only a change in the algorithm is needed to implement an EBD braking system [16]. 
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Figure 2.19 - EBD applying more brake force at the front wheels in a front engine car 
2.3.5  Electronic Brake Assist (EBA)  
When facing a sudden obstacle the driver has a limited time to react and press the brakes 
to avoid a collision. Even if the driver's reaction is promptly, the force which is applied to the 
brake pedal might not be enough to stop the vehicle on time. Several studies have concluded 
that drivers do not apply sufficient brake force in emergency situations [17]. This fact can be 
originated by several factors, such as emotional stress created by the unexpected situation, 
bad seat position and many others. 
 Assisted braking minimizes braking distance in critical situations by detecting emergency 
braking intentions and applying maximum braking force. Emergency braking can be detected 
as drivers tend to press the brake pedal much faster in critical situations. Analogously, when 
the throttle pedal is quickly released, the EBA control unit can detect this situation and apply 
brake force. More complex approaches consist in building a model of the driver's behavior 
under normal circumstances and monitor for abnormal behavior such as the situations 
described.  
Figure 2.20 illustrates the principle of operation of the EBA. The system detects an 
abnormally fast brake pedal depression and outputs maximum brake force, which is 
afterwards modulated by the ABS. 
 
 
  
Figure 2.20 - EBA actuation  
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2.3.6  Architecture of Braking ECUs 
All of the systems described from Sections 2.3.1 through Sections 2.3.5 are usually 
embedded in the same ECU. Hence, an architecture capable of serving the operation of the 
referred systems was already presented in Figure 2.18. 
In a small minority of the studied wiring diagrams from different manufacturers, it was 
observed that the ESC and TCS can be implemented in separate control modules. In these 
cases, the interaction between the ESC or TCS and the ABS brake unit, where the BA and EBD 
are implemented, is done by means of a communication network. When required, these 
systems request braking actions to the ABS unit so its task can be accomplished. 
2.4  Instrument Panels 
Displaying the right information to the driver is crucial for the good handling and 
management of the vehicle. It permits the driver to have a better perception of his driving, 
adapt it according to the surrounding conditions and be aware of problems with the vehicle 
that can result in undesirable or dangerous situations.  
In this section, the data that must be presented to the driver, its sources and how these 
interconnect with the instrument panel are presented. 
2.4.1  Information to Display 
2.4.1.1  Vehicle Speed 
Drivers naturally sense vehicle speed through a combination of their sensations: their 
vision, engine noise, and handling feel, or road feel as it is commonly known.  However, 
vehicles are becoming more comfortable and some of the features that contribute to a more 
comfortable vehicle are enemies from the drivers' speed perception. Vehicles are becoming 
less noisy due to a better engine/motor performance and a better cabin noise insulation. At 
the same time almost every vehicle is equipped with power steering or steer by wire systems 
(in the near future) which shades or eliminates road feel.  
This means that the driver's sensorial input signals are being attenuated. In this way, 
drivers are becoming less likely to have a good prediction about their travelling speed. Also, 
drivers tend to underestimate their travelling speed which can lead to not respecting speed 
limits which may lead to a dangerous driving behavior [18]. Therefore, it is crucial for the 
driver to know its travelling speed as this information serves as feedback for its control 
attitudes over the vehicle.  
The speed of a vehicle is generally acquired in two different ways: 
 
1. Through a vehicle speed sensor that is placed on the transmission and connected 
to the motor/engine ECU.  
 
2. By means of wheel speed sensors used in braking systems. 
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2.4.1.2  Motor Revolutions per Minute (RPM) 
Motor revolutions per minute provides the driver with an estimation of the effort that is 
being performed by the motor. It enables the driver to keep that effort below its nominal 
value and not overload the motor.  
RPM can be acquired by means of a rotational speed sensor placed in the motor shaft. 
This value serves as feedback for the motor control unit and thus, the instrument panel 
obtains its value by means of a network connection to the motor control ECU. 
2.4.1.3  Battery Levels 
The driver must be at all times aware of the amount of energy available in the vehicle in 
order to avoid unpleasant situations. This can be displayed either by means of battery level 
percentage or/and by an estimation of the number of kilometers. In order to do that the ECU 
that controls the batteries must be connected to the instrument panel ECU (directly or 
indirectly). 
2.4.1.4  Braking Systems Information 
Whenever the ABS, TCS or ESC systems are required to intervene is because the vehicle is 
facing possible dangerous situations. Despite these systems can avoid certain situations they 
cannot change the laws of physics to avoid accidents. Therefore the driver must be notified 
whenever these systems take actions as this is a direct consequence of road conditions and 
driving style. The computational elements in braking systems are aware of the driving surface 
and therefore can provide the driver with data that he might not be aware of. 
On most of the instrument panels available, this information is displayed in the form of a 
brake system activity lamp(s), which will be on its on-state when one of the braking system 
features intervenes or in case of any fault detected upon diagnostic. 
2.4.1.5  Tire Pressure 
The display of anomalies in tire pressure is a critical matter. Lower than nominal tire 
pressure causes abnormal heating of the tires, which may result in tire rupture. On the other 
hand, higher than nominal tire pressure causes excess wear. Tire pressure management 
systems perform periodic acquisitions of tire pressure and by means of a network connection 
with the instrument panel ECU, display tire pressures and diagnostics. 
2.4.1.6  Lights Status 
The status of the vehicle lights is important as the driver might not be able to detect it in 
certain environments. During daytime and in places where the use of lights is mandatory the 
driver might not be aware of the lights status due to the abundant luminosity. Also, during 
the night the type of active lights might not be easily distinguishable depending on luminosity 
conditions. Therefore, the awareness of lights' status is considered to be important as lighting 
plays an important role in safety. 
2.4.1.7  Motor Diagnostics 
The driver should be notified upon detection of any failure or abnormal state on the 
motor. Diagnosis such as computational failure, excessive motor temperature or sensor failure 
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(among all other critical variables) should be in the origin of possible driver alerts, in order 
for the driver to take appropriate actions to avoid or solve the problem.  
2.4.1.8  Systems Status 
When vehicles possess features like cruise control systems, speed limitation and others 
that might affect the control of the vehicle, the driver must be aware of these systems' 
status. 
 
2.4.2  Instrument Panel Architectures 
The following examples of instrument panel architectures are based on real 
implementations and were adapted for a better understanding of the philosophies involved. 
Consequently, the number and type of systems connected to the instrument panel is variable 
and serve as an example only. Although the following diagrams contain more components, 
only the systems that require its information displayed to the driver are illustrated.  
In this section, two different architectures regarding two different philosophies are 
presented. These are represented in their pure form for a better understanding, as 
manufacturers often implement solutions that reflect a mixture between these architectures 
according to their necessities.  
2.4.2.1  Point-to-point Architecture 
 
 
 
Figure 2.21 - Instrument panel point-to-point architecture example 
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The philosophy behind this architecture consists in hardwiring all the sensors whose 
variables are to be displayed to the instrument panel ECU. Sensor acquisition is performed by 
the instrument panel ECU, which controls digital displays, gauges and warning lamps 
according to the values provided by the sensors. For instance, the engine ECU provides the 
crankshaft sensor output to the instrument panel ECU so the value of RPM can be computed 
and displayed.  
Warning lamps can be directly actuated by the sources of information. Systems like the 
supplemental  restraint system, ABS, TCS, ESC, lighting systems among others, are commonly 
hardwired to their respective warning lamps, which are activated upon activity or diagnostic 
reasons. Warning lamps can also be actuated by the instrument panel ECU, when the input 
signal provided by the sensor is not in the form of an on/off state and needs to be computed. 
As an example, the connection between the engine coolant temperature sensor and the 
instrument panel ECU enables the instrument panel MCU to analyze the engine coolant 
temperature and actuate the warning lamps accordingly.  
2.4.2.2  Networked Architecture 
 
 
Figure 2.22 - Instrument panel networked architecture example 
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The philosophy inherent to the architecture described on Figure 2.22 consists on 
integrating the instrument panel ECU in a network connection with the sources of 
information. 
 Two different types of networks are connected to the instrument panel ECU. The first, as 
seen on the left part of Figure 2.22 is a high speed network where  the engine ECU, brake ECU 
and all the dynamic controllers of the vehicle are connected. The second network at the right 
part of Figure 2.22 is a low speed network where components mainly belonging to the body 
domain are connected. Just like it was referred on the previous architecture, controllers are 
directly connected to the lamps as necessary.  
The fuel level sensor, lighting switches and others whose values are not required by any 
ECUs are computed by a multifunction ECU, which transmits its values over the network to 
the instrument panel.  
Variables of interest which have to be displayed and are produced within an ECU are 
transmitted over the network to the instrument panel ECU. As an example, the crankshaft 
position sensor is required by the engine ECU as the value of RPM is required for controlling 
the engine. RPM is computed on the engine control ECU and sent over network so it can be 
displayed to the driver. 
This solution has many advantages comparing to the architecture demonstrated on Section 
2.4.2.1: 
 
1 .  The number and complexity of wiring is drastically reduced 
2 .  The number of elements that may be connected with the instrument panel is only 
limited by the type of network 
3 .  The complexity of the information that is displayed is higher 
4 .  The flexibility is higher, as the information to display is not dependent on the 
number and type of interfaces present on the instrument panel controller. 
 
By integrating the instrument panel ECU in a network with other systems, the ECU can 
capture messages that are being traded between other systems. For instance, when loss of 
traction is detected by the TCS, a message is transmitted by the TCS to the motor ECU to 
reduce torque. The instrument panel ECU can capture this message and display the TCS 
activity to the driver. In this way, network load and computational efforts are optimized. 
Additional systems can be integrated by simply connecting them to the corresponding 
network. Extra sensors that are required for displaying information to the driver can be 
connected to multifunction ECUs that are connected to the network.  
2.5  Steering Systems 
The steering system is responsible for transforming the driver's steering intentions into the 
actual change of vehicle direction. Steering systems have evolved from rather simple 
mechanical systems to sophisticated intelligent systems that ease the driving, provide more 
comfort and offer more security.  
Steering systems started as purely mechanical systems in which no assistance was 
provided to aid the driver in steering the wheels. In these systems the driver was the unique 
source of the force required for overcoming the friction coefficient between the surface and 
the tires. When the vehicle is stopped or moving slowly, the effort demanded to the driver for 
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steering the wheels can cause the driving experience to be quite unpleasant. The heavier a 
vehicle is or the largest its tires are, the more this issue is aggravated.  
This situation was later overcame by power steering systems, which are available in the 
vast majority of vehicles sold nowadays and consist on mechanisms to assist the driver in 
turning the wheels by amplifying the driver's steering torque inputs [19]. Power steering 
systems exist mainly in three different kinds: hydraulic, hybrid i.e., a mixture between 
hydraulic  and electric, and electric.  
These systems allowed that heavier vehicles or equipped with wider tires could be easily 
maneuvered, despite the higher frictional forces associated with these characteristics. The 
mechanical details of such systems are not in the scope of this document, but a simple 
explanation of each these systems will aid the understanding of the factors and issues 
involved later in this section.  
The last trend in steering systems are the steer-by-wire systems, in which on the contrary 
of other systems mentioned above, is based on the removal of all mechanical connections 
between the steering inputs and the steering actuators. Steer-by-wire concepts are described 
later on Chapter 4.  
Four wheel steering is another concept whose popularity is gaining ground, and 
therefore is also referred in this section.  
2.5.1  Hydraulic Power Steering 
In hydraulic power steering systems, the assisting force is provided by pressurized fluids. 
Hydraulic fluid pressure is controlled by a pump which is mechanically coupled  with the 
engine. Therefore, the rotation speed of the pump's rotor depends on engine speed. Figure 
2.23 and Figure 2.24 illustrates a hydraulic power steering system applied in a rack-and-
pinion configuration.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.23 - Hydraulic power steering system applied to a rack-and-pinion configuration [20] 
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Figure 2.24 - Power steering hydraulic pump [20] 
 
Hydraulic power steering systems are made in such a way that when the vehicle is idle, 
there is enough pressure for the steering to be comfortable. This has the consequence that 
when the vehicle moves faster, more pressure than needed is created, inducing the feeling 
that the steering is too soft. In order for this pressure not to raise to dangerous levels that 
could damage the hydraulic circuitry, a pressure relief valve is inserted the hydraulic circuit. 
A mechanical system that senses the steering intention is connected to hydraulic pressure 
valves, for enabling the system to provide assistance only when there is an intention to steer 
the vehicle [21].  
As it can be denoted, these systems do not integrate any electronic device and were 
referred only for contextual reasons.  
2.5.2  Hybrid and Electric Power Steering 
Both hybrid and electrical power steering systems share the same principles. The 
difference between them resides on the source of the assisting force. On hybrid power 
steering systems, the assisting force is provided by hydraulic pressure, by means of an 
electric pump, while in electrical power steering systems the same is provided by means of an 
electrical motor.  
When the driver intends to steer, it applies a force on the steering input device. Along 
with the speed of the vehicle, this torque is fed onto the power steering control ECU and the 
required assistance is evaluated taking these parameters into account. An example of an 
assisting curve can be depicted on Figure 2.25.  
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Figure 2.25 - Power steering assist curve [22] 
 
The assisting force must be higher when the vehicle is stopped and tend to zero as speed 
increases. This enables the driver to have a more precise control of the vehicle.  
Power steering systems are mechanically connected in such a way that a computational 
failure in the system does not cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle, as there is 
always a mechanical connection between the steering input system and the wheels. However, 
a faulty element can lead the force providing mechanism to develop a force when it is not 
supposed to. Such a situation can be dangerous and therefore, steering systems must be 
provided with fail safe mechanisms.  
2.5.2.1  Electro-Hydraulic Power Steering 
The electro hydraulic power steering system was developed with two main objectives. 
The first was the reduction of fuel consumption, associated with the ineffective arrangement 
consisting on having the hydraulic pump coupled with the engine. Secondly, extra comfort 
and controllability were demanded, as hydraulic power steering systems' natural assisting 
curve (in which the steering force rises with vehicle speed) did not offer a satisfactory 
behavior. 
In electro hydraulic power steering systems, the hydraulic pump is driven by an electric 
motor and not by the engine. Therefore, the hydraulic pressure applied to assist the steering 
can be regulated by controlling the electric motor. 
2.5.2.2  Electric Power Steering (EPS)  
Electric power steering systems take advantage of electric motors to provide the assisting 
steering force. Its working principle is similar to the hybrid power steering system. Comparing 
with the other solutions discussed,  EPS reduces energy consumption, the steering system's 
weight, provides easier and more powerful control methods [23], and is more environmental 
friendly due to the elimination of the hydraulic fluid [24].  
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Figure 2.26 - Electric power steering [24] 
2.5.3  Power Steering Architecture 
In Figure 2.27 the architecture of a basic power steering architecture can be observed. 
Although only the basic sensors are represented, other variables can be taken in account to 
enhance the performance of the power steering system such as a steering angle sensor, 
steering speed, lateral acceleration, motor temperature among others. 
 
 
Figure 2.27 - Power steering architecture 
Vehicle speed is either obtained by connecting the vehicle speed sensor to power steering 
MCU or by means of a network connection between the power steering control unit and the 
motor or brake ECUs. 
The power steering ECU is commonly connected to the instrument panel ECU so that 
diagnostic data can be exchanged. The failure of the power steering system can have 
catastrophic consequences. Therefore the power steering control unit is commonly suited 
with fault detection mechanisms which de-energize the steering actuators in case of 
computational failure. 
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2.5.4  Four Wheel Steering (4WS) 
Ackerman driving is the driving configuration of cars and 4x4 motorcycles. It consists of 
two wheels that do not steer in the rear and two wheels that steer in the front. Ackerman's 
principle relies on intersecting at all times the axis of all of the wheels in one point. In case 
this intersection is not observed, slippage of the wheels occurs [25].  
The point where the axis of all wheels intersect is denominated the instantaneous point of 
curvature. Therefore, as it can be observed by Figure 2.28, inner wheels turn sharper than 
outer wheels in respect to the curve. 
 
 
Figure 2.28 : Ackerman drive geometry 
 
Four wheel steering can reduce the instantaneous point of curvature (21% referred on 
[26]) and provide more mobility to a vehicle. This is useful when the vehicle is moving slowly, 
so that maneuvers can be made more easily. 4WS enables the reduction of the instantaneous 
center of curvature by steering the rear wheels in the opposite direction than the front 
wheels. 
 
 
Figure 2.29 : 4WD decrease of turning radius 
 
At high speeds, 4WS increases vehicle stability [27]. To achieve that, rear wheels steer in 
the same direction as the front wheels. 
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Figure 2.30 - 4WD at high speeds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.31 - Increased stability of the 4WS system when compared to 2WS [28] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.32 - 4WS Jeep Hurricane [29] 
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2.5.4.1  4WS architecture 
The four wheel steering architecture is depicted on Figure 2.33. The 4WS MCU analyses 
the steering wheel position and vehicle speed. After computing the desired rear wheel 
position, rear wheels are orientated by means of an electric motor. 
The steering wheel position can be shared by the power steering ECU by means of a 
network connection or the steering wheel position sensor can be directly connected to the 
4WS control unit.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.33 - 4WS architecture 
2.6  Exterior Lighting Systems 
Lights have the task of illuminating the path to the driver and to assist in evidencing the 
vehicle's shape, so other drivers are aware of it with the minimum possible effort. According 
to an issued report by the United States department of transportation, vision contributes with 
90% of the information needed to the driver, hence the fact that most of the accidents 
happen at night, or during bad visibility periods due to poor weather conditions such as rain 
or fog. 
The types of lights that shall be present in a vehicle and the situations that their use is 
mandatory varies from country to country. The various types of lights that are commonly 
found in vehicles are: 
 
1. Low beam - Cruising lights that do not obfuscate other drivers and provide 
enough illumination for night driving 
2. High beam - Intense lights that can only be used when the vehicle is not crossing 
with other vehicles as it produces considerable amounts of glare  
3. Daytime running lamps - Mandatory in some countries. Low intensity lights that 
enable a better perception of the vehicle  
4. Directional indicators - Blinking lights that indicate other drivers the intention in 
changing direction.  
5. Brake lights - Give other drivers the information that the vehicle is braking 
6. Reverse lights - Provide other drivers with the indication that the vehicle is 
driving on reverse 
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7. Fog lights - Provide better illumination on foggy environments  
 
Lighting systems have been suffering a deep evolution in the past years. The lighting 
system is changing from being a static system, to a dynamic system that actively contributes 
to safety and comfort.  
In this section, several emergent features regarding lighting systems are presented. The 
names in which these systems are known vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. 
Therefore, adaptations or mixes between system names are used.   
This section would not be complete without a brief comment on light-emitting-diode 
(LED) lighting systems, due to their potential of becoming the most widely used lighting 
solution. LED lighting systems offer space reduction, less energy consumption, longer lasting 
life and faster rise to full intensity than standard bulbs. Due to the massification of its 
production, prices are dropping which means that it is expected that in the future the vast 
majority of the cars will run on led lights. Despite of what can be thought at first sight, the 
task of implementing LED lights on a vehicle is not trivial, due to the fact that in combustion 
engine vehicles the battery voltage can vary between 9 to 16 Volt. Therefore, the traditional 
way of driving a LED which consists in connecting a series resistor is not applicable, since 
variations in voltage cause variations in the LEDs' currents, which in turn will cause a variation 
on light intensity. Instead, buck-boost controllers are commonly implemented, which typically 
requires a microcontroller to generate the duty cycle signal and perform monitoring on LED's 
current so it doesn't exceed its rated value. 
2.6.1  Automatic Lighting 
Automatic lighting systems activate low beam lights upon detection of darkness or rain. 
This is achieved by sensing ambient light and rain through specific sensors that are connected 
to the lights ECU. 
2.6.2  Fused Light Detection 
The fused light detection system operates by monitoring the current fed to each bulb. 
When the lights ECU sends a signal to activate a certain bulb and no current flowing to it, it 
may indicate that the bulb is fused. In case of LED lights are used in series, an increase in the 
LED's current may also indicate led failure. 
2.6.3  Dynamic Headlight Range Adjustment 
Vehicle dynamic motion on the vertical axis causes the range of the headlights to change. 
When the vehicle is tilting forward, the range is reduced thus reducing the driver's sight. 
Upon forward tilt, the range is augmented, in which glare can be induced and blind other 
drivers. Vehicle front and rear tilting happens for several reasons: heavy load on the rear or 
front of the vehicle, bumps on the road or upon fast accelerations or decelerations. 
The objective of the dynamic headlight range adjustment system is to grant that the 
vertical motion of the vehicle does not affect the headlights range.  
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Figure 2.34 - Vehicle with headlights on 
Figure 2.34 depicts a vehicle with its low beam headlights turned. Due to  the flat surface 
of the road and the vehicle's weight distribution, the light rays are pointing down, not causing 
glare to the front vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 2.35 - Range of headlights increased due to forward tilt 
It can be seen on Figure 2.35 that a forward tilt caused by a bump on the road increases 
the level of the headlights, which can cause the front driver to dazzle.   
In a vehicle with dynamic headlight range adjustment, sensors monitor the vertical 
dynamics of the vehicle and, upon detection of front or rear tilts, the direction of the lights is 
adjusted, granting a constant range.  
  
 
Figure 2.36 - Dynamic headlights range adjustment maintaining headlight range despite of vehicle tilt 
 
2.6.3.1  Dynamic Headlight Range Adjustment Architecture 
Figure 2.37 depicts the architecture of light system with dynamic headlight range 
adjustment.  
Switches are responsible for acquiring the driver's commands. In some of the studied 
systems these are connected to a dedicated unit responsible for acquiring their state and 
sharing it by means of a network connection with the lights ECU. 
 The front and rear level sensors are responsible for acquiring information relative to the 
vertical dynamics of the vehicle. In some vehicles the value of these sensors is computed in 
another ECU which has the task of controlling the vertical dynamics of the vehicle and shared 
via network (dynamic suspension ECU).  
Upon detection of a forward or rear tilt, the MCU which controls the lighting system 
request the motor controllers to assume a predetermined position. 
Light intensity controllers receive commands via communications network to 
enable/disable the controlled lights and adjust their intensity. 
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Figure 2.37 - Dynamic Headlight Range Adjustment Architecture 
2.6.4  Adaptive Cornering Light 
Having a good light source is not enough for the driver to have a good visibility. If lights 
are not pointed to the vehicle's path, the driver might not be aware of obstacles within its 
trajectory. Figure 2.38 depicts a vehicle turning without adaptive cornering light. It can be 
seen that the lights are pointing to the front of the vehicle while the vehicle is having a 
circular motion.  
 
 
Figure 2.38 - Vehicle without adaptive cornering light system 
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Figure 2.39 illustrates a vehicle equipped with the adaptive cornering light system. The 
lights ECU analyzes vehicle dynamics and calculates where the lights should be pointed at. 
Electric motors adjust the determined swivel angle so the lights are always pointed to the 
direction of motion of the vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 2.39 - Vehicle equipped with adaptive light cornering system 
The swivel angle is determined based on three variables: vehicle speed, steering wheel 
position and yaw rate. The steering wheel position is used to compute the swivel angle for 
low speeds (typically below 40 Km/h), while for high speeds both the vehicle speed sensor 
and yaw rate are used to compute the swivel angle. 
2.6.4.1  Adaptive Cornering Light System's Architecture 
An architecture able of implementing the adaptive cornering light system is similar to that 
given on Figure 2.37, with the addition of motors and their respective controllers to adjust 
the horizontal position of the lights. The value the yaw sensor is typically shared by the brake 
ECU while the steering wheel angle is typically shared by the power steering ECU.  
2.6.5  Camera Based Lighting Systems 
This section provides a brief description of the upcoming (and already available in some 
high end models) lighting systems that provide extra safety and comfort. All of the systems 
described in this section rely on image analysis. 
2.6.5.1  High Beam Assist 
Several studies point out that high beam lights are rarely used even in situations when 
these do not cause other drivers to glare. This can be seen as a waste of illumination 
potential as high beam lights illuminate much further ahead, giving extra time for the driver 
to perceive potential dangerous situations and react accordingly.  
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The high beam assist system captures images of the surrounding environment such as road 
lights, headlights and rear lights of other vehicles and decides whether high beam lights are 
required or not. In case that the road light is sufficient or in case other vehicles are in risk of 
perceiving glare, high beam lights are disabled.  
2.6.5.2  Adaptive Cutoff Line 
Adaptive cut-off line system can be seen as an upgrade of the high beam assist. It has the 
task of optimizing the driver's visibility. A camera analyses front vehicles, and light angle is 
adapted so the cut-off line ends as far as possible, while not blinding the front vehicle's 
driver. If the system does not detect any drivers ahead, low beam lights are switched to high 
beam. Figure 2.40 illustrates an adaptive cut-off regulating the cut-off line according to the 
front vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 2.40 - Adaptive cutoff line 
2.6.5.3  Glare Free Systems 
Glare free systems are another update of the high beam assist system. With it, vehicle's 
can drive with high beam lights on without affecting other drivers. Glare free systems analyze 
the position of other vehicles and block parts of the light that can disturb other drivers.  
 
 
Figure 2.41 - Glare free system 
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In Figure 2.41 is represented a vehicle with a glare free system that controls a multiple 
LED light source. According to the information acquired through the analysis of camera 
images, the LED modules that have its light rays targeting other vehicles are pointed in a 
direction in which they do not induce glare on other drivers. 
2.6.5.4  Marking Light Systems 
While drivers might be with their attention focused on several light sources, some 
situations might happen that require the driver's sudden attention. Events such as a 
pedestrian crossing or an incoming vehicle in a crossroad might not be flashy enough to get 
the driver's attention.  Marking light systems have the task of illuminating objects that appear 
suddenly, thus shifting the driver's attention for situations that might impose danger.  
 
 
Figure 2.42 - Marking light system evidencing a pedestrian 
Figure 2.42 illustrates a light marking system in action. While the vehicle is driving 
straight ahead, a pedestrian (represented by a red circle) is standing near the crosswalk. The 
marking light system identifies this situation and illuminates the pedestrian so the driver can 
be aware of it. 
2.6.5.5  Night Vision Systems 
Night vision systems take advantage of infra red light to capture what the human eye 
cannot. In a vehicle equipped with a night vision system, an infrared light source emits 
infrared light, which hits objects and reflects back to an infrared camera that is connected to 
an image analysis system and a monitor. The image analysis system performs routines in order 
to detect potential dangerous situations, and upon detection of these engages actions so the 
driver can be aware of it.  
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Figure 2.43 - BMW night vision system 
 
2.6.6  Lighting Systems Architecture 
Figure 2.44 depicts an architecture capable of handling all the described features. Image 
processing tasks are generally achieved in a microcontroller with an embedded digital signal 
processor (DSP) due to the high computational power required. 
 
 
Figure 2.44 - Lighting systems' architecture 
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2.7  Propulsion System 
In this section a brief description of electrical propulsion systems is presented. Electrical 
propulsion systems consist of five main elements: the motor controller, an electronic power 
conversion unit, the electric motor (or motors), transmission (if required) and wheels.  
The motor controller determines the desired torque/speed values according to the system 
inputs, and actuates the power drivers in order to achieve the desired performance. The 
inputs to the propulsion system MCU are the throttle and brake pedals (refer to Section 2.7.1) 
positions and requests from other ECUs. 
Among others that might arise from the systems installed in the vehicle, typical requests 
are torque reduction requests from the TCS system, speed setpoints by the adaptive cruise 
control system, or regenerative braking requests by the braking ECU. Such systems are 
interconnected to the motor ECU by means of a network connection. The outputs of the 
motor ECU and feedback sensor variables are conditioned by the type of motor used and the 
chosen control method. Figure 2.45 depicts an illustration of the typical architecture of an EV 
propulsion system. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.45 - Propulsion system architecture 
2.7.1  Regenerative Braking 
The electric motor has the task of converting the electrical energy provided by the 
batteries/ultracapacitors into the motional energy that is responsible for moving the vehicle. 
Also, the opposite can happen as electric motors can act as generators, proving energy back 
to the source. When a motor is acting like a generator, a torque which counteracts the 
rotation of the motor is induced. The use of this torque to aid in braking the vehicle is called 
regenerative braking.  
Regenerative braking is important as huge amounts of energy are wasted in the form of 
temperature in frictional brakes, and energy is considered to be the main problem that needs 
to be overcome in order to make EVs commercially viable. As an example, in [30] is claimed 
an increase of 8-25% in EV's driving range by the use of regenerative braking and its efficiency 
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is empowered in stop-and-go driving conditions such as in city environment. Moreover, it 
prevents wear on mechanical brakes.  
Energy regeneration happens when the motor's back electromotive force (EMF) is greater 
than the voltage supplied by the power driver. In this way, instead of flowing from the 
batteries to the motor, current flows from the motor to the batteries. This happens when the 
speed of the motor is higher than the demanded speed.  
Regenerative braking alone does not provide enough braking force [31]. Hence, frictional 
braking systems must coexist and work together with the motor ECU, which controls 
regenerative braking to generate the desired braking force altogether.  
Only the axles/wheels that are connected to the motor/s can capture energy. When 
braking, in order to regenerate the maximum amount of energy, the regenerative braking 
force value must be the maximum value that can be provided without provoking wheel lock-
up. In situations where high intensity braking is demanded, in which the amount of braking 
force surpasses the value that regenerative braking can provide, the remaining brake force is 
provided by frictional brake systems. Hence, regenerative braking relies on a strong 
cooperation between the motor and braking control units.  
2.7.2  Cruise Control 
The cruise control system enables vehicle speed to be automatically controlled. This 
results in higher comfort and ultimately in safety, as drivers tend to drive faster if the speed 
is not automatically controlled with the increase of the journey time.   
Typically, it requires no additional hardware as the control can be achieved by software 
in the motor controller.  
2.8  Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) 
The adaptive cruise control system is an enhancement of the cruise control system. 
Besides maintaining a constant speed when no vehicles are located ahead, the ACC measures 
the travelling speed of vehicles ahead, their distance and angle by means of a radar sensor 
and actuates the throttle pedal and brakes automatically in order to maintain a constant 
distance or headway time [32]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.46 - Adaptive Cruise Control maintaining a constant headway time [33] 
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 The adaptive cruise control is a complex system which relies not only on the radar sensor 
but also in values provided by other ECUs, as detecting objects alone is not enough for 
performing a correct evaluation of the situation.  
The objects that must be considered for the adaptive cruise control operation are the 
ones traveling in the same lane as the vehicle. Situations where the vehicle is turning, and 
consequently in which front vehicles are also turning, demand the cooperation between 
several control units, which provide the values of interest variables such as speed of the 
vehicle, steering angle and yaw momentum that enable the ACC system to evaluate the 
situation. Such variables are also used for performing calculations when the vehicle is 
changing lanes, as the ACC is required to track objects on the lane in which the vehicle is 
moving to.  
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Chapter 3  
In-Vehicle Networks 
3.1  Introduction 
This section presents the major networking solutions used by manufacturers to 
interconnect the systems referred in the previous chapter.  
The first computational based features that were implemented in the automotive industry 
relied on centralized architectures, consisting of a set of sensors and actuators connected to 
a microcontroller.  
Due to the low interaction between ECUs, in the cases that data exchanges were 
required, this would be achieved by means of point-to-point connections between the 
corresponding ECUs. Upon appearance of more complex features that demanded a strong 
cooperation between multiple ECUs, allied to a significant increase in the number of sensors 
and actuators connected to ECUs, the huge number of wires present in vehicles started to 
compromise their overall competitiveness: cost, complexity, reliability and weight were the 
major concerns [34].  
Soon, the automotive market started to demand solutions that that could enable multiple 
ECUs to transmit data over the same transmission medium.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Reduction of number of wiring by means of interconnecting ECUs in a network 
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Due to their importance in the automotive market, the controller area network (CAN), the 
local interconnect network (LIN) and Flexray are introduced with further detail.  
3.2  Network Requirements for the Different Automotive 
Domains 
The different vehicle domains discussed in Chapter 2 impose different requirements on 
the networks that support their operation. In [7], the following requirements are considered:  
 
 Fault tolerance - the ability of the communication network to withstand 
behaviors that are not congruent with its specification. Fault tolerant networks 
embed a series of mechanisms such as bus guardians, which prevent nodes to 
transmit in time frames that are reserved for other nodes, and redundant 
hardware and software which provide error detection, confinement and recovery 
 
 Predictability - the ability of a communication system to know when messages 
will be transmitted. Predictable communication systems are usually achieved by 
enforcing messages to be sent at predefined time instants or time intervals 
 
 Bandwidth - the data rate supported by the network system 
 
 Flexibility - the ability of the network to cope with both event and time-triggered 
messages, various scenarios of network load and network scalability 
 
 Security - the ability to prevent unauthorized access 
 
 
Table  3.1 presents the automotive domains referred on Chapter 2 and their major 
requirements 
 
Table  3.1 - Automotive domains and their major requirements. Based in [7] 
Subsystem Fault 
tolerance 
Predictability Bandwidth Flexibility Security 
Powertrain YES YES HIGH NO NO 
Chassis YES YES HIGH SOME NO 
Body SOME SOME MEDIUM SOME NO 
Passive Safety YES YES HIGH NO NO 
HMI/Infotainment NO SOME HIGH YES SOME 
Telematics NO SOME MEDIUM YES YES 
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3.3  In-vehicle Network Classifications 
The Society for Automotive Engineers (SAE) classifies the types of networks which are 
commonly found in vehicles according to their bitrates into four different classes that are 
described in this section. 
3.3.1  Class A Networks 
Class A networks are typically low cost networks characterized by transmission rates lower 
than 10 Kbps, that are used to transmit control data in the body domain [34]. Systems 
integrated in the body domain such as door control, climate control, seat adjustment among 
others, do not impose strict timing requirements or high transmission bitrates, as 
communications are mainly event-triggered. Examples of class A networks are the local 
interconnect network (LIN) and time-triggered protocol A (TTP/A). 
 
3.3.2  Class B Networks 
Class B networks operate at bitrates ranging from 10 to 125 Kbps and are mainly used to 
support data exchanges between ECUs to reduce the number of sensors by sharing 
information [6]. Low-speed CAN and J1850 are examples of class B networks. 
 
3.3.3  Class C Networks 
Class C networks are characterized by having transmission rates from 125 to 1 Mbps, and 
have been used over the years to integrate systems from the powertrain and chassis domain. 
An example of a class C network  is the high-speed CAN. 
 
3.3.4  Class D Networks 
Class D networks operate with bitrates higher than 1 Mbps and are oriented for advanced 
powertrain and chassis systems, supplemental restraint systems, drive-by-wire systems and 
multimedia data [34].  
Examples of class D networks are Byteflight, time-triggered protocol C (TTP/C), Flexray, 
Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST) and FireWire (IEEE 1394). 
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3.4  Communication Networks for the Automotive Industry 
To overcome the perceived limitations of the I2C and D2B networks which were used in 
automobiles [35], Bosch started the development of the network that would revolutionize the 
hole automotive industry in 1983: the controller area network (CAN). The first specifications 
were publicly presented in 1986 at the society of automotive engineers congress, and the 
protocol was widely implemented in the beginning of the 90's.  
CAN was designed to be a high performance communication system to support the 
operation of the powertrain and chassis domain, gifted with powerful arbitration, fault 
detection, error confinement mechanisms, and bit rates ranging from 10 Kbps up to 1 Mbps. It 
is also used as the communication protocol for systems belonging to the body domain, serving 
as the backbone for LIN, a low cost network targeted for the requirements of the body 
domain. Due to its success, CAN became an international standard: ISO 11898 [36].  
As new generations of vehicles started to carry more sophisticated electronic systems, 
along with the upcoming drive-by-wire systems, higher bit rates, strict determinism and more 
reliability started being demanded. 
The necessity for higher bitrates is a consequence of the increase in the number, 
complexity and the level of interaction between the different systems within a vehicle. Bit 
rates up to 10 Mbps are expected to be required [37], as opposed from the 1 Mbps top bitrate 
offered by CAN. 
The upcoming drive-by-wire systems and other critical features require levels of 
determinism which CAN is unable to provide as an event triggered protocol [37]. First of all, 
due to the fact that nodes are allowed to produce messages asynchronously, the number of 
collisions a frame faces with high priority frames is unknown. High priority frames with no 
errors might be sent by a faulty node continuously, giving lower priority frames no chance to 
be transmitted (the babbling idiot problem). Such situations can lead to the miss of deadlines 
of hard real time tasks as well as dangerous jitters that affect control algorithms. 
Furthermore, CAN does not allow a bus guardian to be implemented as a consequence of the 
uncertainty of when a message will be transmitted. Consequently, erroneous nodes 
outputting high level priority messages cannot be disabled, thus blocking the entire network.  
The reliability required by safety critical systems in vehicles demands the support of a 
redundant transmission medium, as critical systems cannot rely on single points of failure. On 
its specification, CAN does not address the implementation of redundant transmission 
mechanisms.  
Several attempts were made to overcome CAN's referred limitations. The most popular 
protocols that were developed in order to overcome CAN limitations were TTCAN, Byteflight 
and TTP [37].  
Exhaustive technical analysis were performed by a group of automotive companies to 
discover whether any of these protocols was capable of meeting all the requirements for the 
upcoming generation of vehicles. It was proved that none of them could fulfill those 
requirements, which led to the development of a new communications network called Flexray 
[38]. Flexray is now starting to be adopted but its cost is still considered to be high and 
therefore it is still used in conjunction with CAN. 
TTEthernet is also able to provide the deterministic behavior and fault tolerance 
mechanisms as Flexray, with the addition of supporting bitrates up to 10Gb/s. Given its 
potential, TTEthernet is discussed in Section 3.8.   
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3.5  Controller Area Network 
Controller area network (CAN) is the most widely used network in the automotive industry 
[39]. Due to its importance, more emphasis is put on this document in the presentation of this 
network. Due to space and time requirements, the vast majority of details behind this 
protocol were omitted, given the amount and complexity of many of the questions involved. 
A detailed description of the protocol can be found in [40]. 
CAN is a multi-master protocol that uses a CSMA/CD (carrier sense multiple 
access/collision detection) mechanism with a non destructive arbitration concept. It is fitted 
with many error detection and recovery features, while granting enough bitrate to be 
adequate to be used as the transfer protocol between high dependability subjects of today's 
vehicles.  
Due to the fact that the frame transmission system in the CAN protocol is based on the 
priority of messages to be transmitted, the CAN protocol enables its nodes to be configured to 
suit the necessities of real time operation, despite being an event-triggered protocol. 
Therefore, CAN has been actively being used as the protocol to transfer information 
between engine, braking systems, power steering, among other ECUs. In [40],  the following 
two layers of the OSI reference model are specified: 
 
1. Physical layer: Description of bit timing, encoding and synchronization. It must 
be empathized the that the transmission medium or drivers are not specified, to 
give room for optimized solutions according to any application. 
 
2. Data link layer 
a. MAC sublayer: Responsible for framing, arbitration, acknowledgement, 
error detection and signaling.  
b. LLC sublayer: message filtering, overload notification and recovery 
management 
 
Gross bitrates achieved by CAN depend on the physical medium and transmission distance. 
Two ISO standards define the electrical characteristics, based on two different speed targets 
according to Table  3.2. 
Table  3.2 - CAN standards 
Group Standard Bit rate 
Low speed CAN ISO1189-3 10 Kb/s to 125 Kb/s 
High speed CAN ISO11989-2 125 Kb/s to 1Mb/s 
 
 
Throughout the following descriptions the same nomenclature of the CAN 2.0 specification 
is used regarding bit values. The transmission medium must be in its recessive state when no 
node is transmitting or is transmitting a recessive bit, and in its dominant value when at least 
one node is transmitting a dominant value even if other nodes are transmitting recessive bits. 
This behavior is denominated as a wired-and logic.  
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3.5.1  CAN Nodes Interaction Model 
Flexibility was one of the major concerns upon the design of the CAN specifications. 
Hence, to outfit each node with a physical address and route messages with the basis of that 
address would not provide the desired elasticity, as changing the network configuration would 
require the reconfiguration of all of the nodes.  
Therefore, CAN nodes transmit messages in a publisher-subscriber fashion. This implies 
that all messages are broadcasted into the network. Upon reception of a message, each node 
decides whether the message is to be processed or not. This decision is based on the message 
identifier, placed on the arbitration field of each frame. 
3.5.2  Bus Access 
In a multimaster network like CAN each node is free to start the transmission of a frame. 
However, multiple nodes can start transferring data at the same time. CAN frames are 
provided with a specific field (the arbitration field) for handling arbitration between 
transmitting nodes. 
During the arbitration phase each sender compares the value present in the transmission 
medium with the value that it has transmitted. In case these values do not match, which 
uniquely happens in the case where the node has outputted a recessive level and a dominant 
level was observed in the line, the sender stops transmitting, as this implies that other node 
is sending a message with higher priority. It is important to note that the presence of multiple 
senders at the same time in the same network does not destroy the content of the higher 
priority frame. This form of arbitration is called non-destructive.  
Figure 3.2 depicts an example of the arbitration procedure between three emitting 
stations.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 - CAN arbitration procedure in a wired-and bus [38] 
The arbitration procedure implies that in a wired-and bus, in which the logical one 
assumes the zero bus value, and a logical zero assumes the one bus value, the lesser a 
message identifier is, the higher priority is granted to the frame. 
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3.5.3  CAN Frames 
3.5.3.1  Data and Remote Frames 
Data frames are types of frames used for different nodes to exchange data. Figure 3.3 
depicts the structure of a CAN 2.0 data frame.  
Remote frames are structurally similar to data frames but do not carry data, and are used 
to request a data frame with the same identifier. 
Every time a data or remote frame is transmitted, an interframe space composed by 3 
recessive bits is present.  
Data and remote frames' identifiers were originally designed with an eleven bit length. 
However, for certain applications, this number was proved to be insufficient. CAN 2.0B 
specification presents an extended version of data and remote frames, using an identifier 
composed of 29 bits.  
Both standard and extended frames can coexist in the same network, making extended 
frames to be an option only when it is actually needed, as the unnecessary number of extra 
bits in the identifier field represents extra overhead. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 - CAN data frame [40] 
 
Start of Frame 
The start of frame field is composed by one dominant bit and has the task of informing all 
nodes that a frame is about to be transferred. 
Arbitration Field 
Bits contained in this field are the basis for the arbitration procedure already discussed. 
The structure of this field in a standard frame is depicted on Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 - Standard format of CAN frame arbitration and control fields [40] 
 
In the standard frame format, the arbitration field carries the 11 bit message identifier, 
plus a bit known as remote transmission request (RTR). This bit signals whether the frame is a 
data or remote frame. Its value is dominant in the case of a data frame and recessive in the 
case of a remote frame. This implies that data frames have priority over remote frames with 
the same identifier.  
The arbitration field of an extended frame is illustrated on Figure 3.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 - Extended format of CAN arbitration and control fields [40] 
As it was already mentioned, the identifier field of an extended frame is composed of 29 
bits. The first 11 bits are denominated the base ID while the remaining bits of the identifier 
are denominate the extended ID.  
The base and the extended ID bits are separated by two bits: the substitute remote 
request (SRR) and the identifier extension bit (IDE).  
The SRR is recessive in an extended frame and overlaps the RTR bit in the standard frame.  
The identifier extension (IDE) bit informs whether a frame is in its extended form or not. 
In the case of a standard frame this bit is dominant, while in the case of an extended frame 
this bit is recessive. In this way, when two data frames with the same base ID are sent over 
the network, in which one of them is in the standard format and the other in the extended 
format, the standard frame will gain access to the bus. 
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Control Field 
The control fields of standard and extended frames are composed of 6 bits.  
Both standard and extended frames are composed of a section named data length code 
(DLC) which is used to specify the number of bytes present in the data field. Due to the fact 
that the maximum number of bytes in the data field is 8, the DLC is made of 4 bits.  
The first two bits of the control field are different for each frame. The control field of 
standard frames is composed of the IDE and a reserved bit (R0) for future uses, while the 
control field of extended frames is composed of the R0 and R1 bits, both reserved for future 
uses. 
It should be noted that the IDE bit is present on the control field of standard frames while 
in extended frames this bit is present on the arbitration field. 
In both types of frames, the reserved bits are sent as dominant.  
Data Field 
The data field is the section where the data is carried. 8 bytes can be transferred from 
the most significant bit (MSB) to the least significant bit (LSB).  
Cyclic Redundancy Check Field (CRC field) 
This section carries an error detection code discussed in Section 3.5.5.3. 
Acknowledge Field (ACK)  
The acknowledge field is similar in both standard and extended frames. It is composed of 
two sections: the ACK field and the ACK delimiter. When transmitting this field, the sender 
switches to listening mode, thus outputting a recessive level on the transmission medium. All 
the nodes in the network which received a successful frame containing no errors output a 
dominant level in the ACK field. This procedure informs the sender that the frame was 
correctly received by at least one node. 
End of Frame 
The end of frame field consists of seven recessive bits, which indicate that the 
transmission of the frame has ended. 
Error Frames 
Error frames are sent immediately on the next bit after the error detection. Upon 
detection of CRC errors, error frames are sent on the first bit after the ACK delimiter. Error 
frames have purposely a structure that violates the stuffing rule (refer to Section 3.5.5.2). 
Therefore, when an error frame is sent by a node which has detected an error, this will cause 
other nodes to detect a stuffing error, which will cause them to output their own error 
frames.  
The structure of error frames is illustrated on Figure 3.6.  
Error frames are composed of an error flag and an error delimiter fields. There are two 
kinds of error flags in the error frames: active and passive flags. The situations whether each 
of the flags is transmitted by a particular node is related to CAN's fault confinement strategy 
which is discussed in Section 3.5.6.  
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Figure 3.6 - CAN error frame structure [40] 
Active error frames are composed of 6 dominant bits, while passive error flags are 
composed by 6 recessive bits. When a node detects a transmission error, it starts emitting its 
own error flag. Therefore, the error flag segment has variable size as it might represent the 
superposition of various error flags between nodes. This superposition will have the maximum 
number of twelve bits, which happens in the case of a node detecting an error after a 
transition from dominant to recessive, which will cause other nodes to only detect the bit 
stuffing violation in the sixth bit of the error flag.  
After outputting an error flag, each station transmits recessive bits.  
Upon detection of a recessive bit in the transmission line, implying that all of the stations 
are transmitting recessive bits, which in turn mean that all nodes have transmitted error 
flags, each node transmits seven more recessive bits. Hence, the error delimiter section is 
composed by eight recessive bits. 
3.5.4  Overload Frames 
Overload frames have the task of creating a delay between the delivery of frames so data 
is not lost by an overloaded node. The structure of overload frames is similar to active error 
frames and two overload frames can be sent consecutively by a particular node.  
Overload frames consist of an overload flag and an overload delimiter, and are 
transmitted by any node under the following circumstances:  
 
1. In case that additional time is required to compute last operations, the overload 
frame is transmitted at the first bit time of the upcoming intermission 
 
2. Upon detection of a dominant bit at the first and second bits of intermission, or a 
dominant bit at the eight bit of the error delimiter, the overload frame is transmitted 
in the next bit after the dominant bit detected 
 
Upon detection of an overload flag, each node outputs its own overload flag.  
The overload delimiter operation is analogous to what was described in the error frame 
section. 
 
3.5.5  Error Detection, Processing and Management 
Due to the fact that CAN serves as the path for the exchange of safety critical messages, 
the protocol is equipped with several error detection mechanisms that are described in this 
section. 
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3.5.5.1  Bus Monitoring 
Disregarding the arbitration and acknowledge fields, when bus access has been granted to 
a node, it compares the value present in the line with the value that it is outputting. In case 
that these do not match, a bit error is present.  
3.5.5.2  Bit Stuffing 
The bit stuffing method consists in having the transmitter of a frame adding an extra bit 
after the detection of five consecutive bits with the same value, whose value is the 
complement of those bits. 
In this way, errors in which the node's outputs stay fixed in a dominant or recessive level 
are detected. Due to the fact that the CRC delimiter, ACK field and end of frame have fixed 
structures, these are not stuffed. 
3.5.5.3  Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) 
The cyclic redundancy check code is the rest of the division formed by treating the stream 
of bits since the start of frame until the end of the data field as a polynomial (with fifteen 
zeros added to the less significant coefficients and not stuffed) by the polynomial 𝑔 𝑥 =
 𝑥15 + 𝑥14 + 𝑥10 + 𝑥8 + 𝑥7 + 𝑥4 + 𝑥3 + 1 (BCH code). This value is sent on the CRC field.  
Upon reception of a frame, the receiver calculates the CRC value of the received message 
and compares with the received CRC value. In case that these values do not match, a 
transmission error has occurred.  
3.5.5.4  Message Frame Check 
Transmission errors can affect the frame's structure. Hence, each node monitors messages 
and checks whether incoming messages respect the frame's structure. In case this structure is 
not respected an error is signaled. 
3.5.5.5  Acknowledgement Field 
The acknowledgment of messages serves as the confirmation that a frame was correctly 
transmitted over the network (disregarding the unlikely event that an error might assume the 
form of a positive acknowledge). In case that the sender does not receive any positive 
acknowledgement, it can conclude that the message was not correctly transmitted and thus 
outputs an error frame. 
3.5.5.6  Error Frames Dispatch 
Error frames dispatching is discussed in Section 3.5.3.2. 
 
3.5.6  Fault Confinement Strategy  
The CAN protocol tries to minimize the effect of erroneous nodes on the network by 
confining their behavior. For this purpose, two kinds of counters are present  in each node: 
one for counting transmission errors and other for counting reception errors.  
Every time a transmission or reception error is detected the respective counter is 
incremented. On the contrary, upon successful reception or transmission the respective error 
counters are decremented. The increment/decrement of counters do not follow a 
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proportional rule, as errors cause the counters to be incremented by a greater value than the 
decrease of its value upon detection of a successful transfer. 
This provides a better perception of the fail distribution among the network as well a 
more strict confinement rule. Figure 3.7 illustrates the error confinement strategy: 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - Transitions between error states in CAN 
 
If error counters are both below 128 the node is said to be on the active error state. Being 
in the active error state means that the node operates normally and, upon detection of an 
error, the node will output an active error flag, causing other nodes to detect this error flag.  
If both counters are below 255 and at least one of the counters is above 127 the node is 
said to be on the passive error state. Likewise, the node will operate normally but upon 
detection of an error the node will output an error frame with a passive error flag, thus not 
interfering with the rest of the network.  
Nodes enter the bus off mode when transmission error counters are higher than 255. In 
the bus off mode nodes are not allowed to transmit. This prevents a faulty node to block the 
entire network. In this state the node is not allowed to transmit, but it monitors the network 
as 128 occurrences of 11 successive recessive bits trigger the node back to the active error 
state.  
3.6  Flexray 
Flexray is a communication system targeted for high-speed control applications in vehicles 
such as advanced powertrain, chassis, and by-wire systems [41]. Flexray is able to offer bit 
rates up to 10 Mbps and provides the support for dual-channel communication systems, which 
can either be used to provide redundancy if the same frames are carried in both 
communication channels, or double the available bandwidth, in case that the secondary 
channel is used for the transmission of additional data. 
Not only it does it enable bus topologies, but also other complex approaches such as 
active and passive stars, and mixes between these topologies to be implemented. Examples 
of topologies supported by Flexray can be found in Figure 3.8. 
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In addition to this, Flexray is able to grant bounded latencies and jitter through the aid of 
a TDMA based approach, a basic requirement for distributed control systems, while not 
leaving behind the support of event driven occurrences. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 - Flexray topologies [42] 
3.6.1  Bus Access 
Bus access within the Flexray protocol occurs taking as basis a communication cycle 
where two different bus access mechanisms take place. The first mechanism occurs in a 
section called the static segment and is based on the TDMA approach, able to guarantee fixed 
latencies and jitter in which distributed control systems rely on. The dynamic segment is 
responsible for handling events which are not periodic in its nature. The transfer of frames 
within this segment is subject to a prioritizing rule based on the frame identifiers. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 - Flexray communication cycle 
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3.6.2  Static Segment 
The static segment is where time-triggered frames are scheduled. It is divided in an equal 
number of sections called slots where each frame is carried. The number of slots present in 
the static segment is the number of frames that are exchanged periodically. 
 In order to ensure that two nodes do not communicate at the same time, slots are 
associated with frame identifiers which cannot be shared. Allocation of the frames to the 
respective slots is a process done offline. To maintain the periodicity of the communication 
cycle, if a frame is not sent in the respective slot, other frames are not anticipated and the 
slot time will carry no data.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 - Flexray static segment 
 
Due to the fact that a node is only allowed to communicate in a given slot if its frame ID 
is associated with that slot, nodes must keep track of the current slots in order to schedule 
the release of its frames. This is done by means of a local variable that starts with the value 1 
in the beginning of each static segment and is incremented at each slot time. 
The static segment enables control loops to be implemented in a single static segment. 
This scheme is known as in-cycle control [43].  
Figure 3.11 illustrates an example of what can be done using this technique in an ABS 
system. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 - Flexray in-cycle control 
Assuming that wheel speed sensors are connected in a Flexray network, frames carrying 
the values of wheel speed sensors are transmitted to the ABS ECU in the first slots of the 
static segment. Slots after the sensor acquisition that might carry or not useful data for other 
processes, enable the ABS ECU to have to time to process the desired brake values. After 
processing the wheel speed sensors' values, the ABS ECU can share the brake pressure values 
with the network. This control approach enables a tighter control of the processes within the 
vehicle. 
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3.6.3  Dynamic Segment 
The dynamic segment has a fixed length and is composed by subsections called minislots. 
Similarly to what was described in the static segment, each minislot is associated with one 
frame ID. If a node desires to transmit a determined frame it may only start its transmission 
within the associated minislot, and the access to the medium is granted until the end of the 
transmission, or the end of the dynamic segment. Hence, minislots grow taking the time of 
minislots with lower priority. Therefore, the closer to the beginning of the dynamic segment a 
minislot is, the higher priority a frame associated with that minislot will have. 
Figure 3.12 depicts an example which contains a schematic of its minislots and associated 
frame IDs, in the case that no frame is transmitted within its associated minislot.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 - Minislots in the dynamic segment 
 
If it is assumed that frames 2 and 4 are to be dispatched, once the dynamic segment 
reaches minislot 2, the node responsible for frame ID 2 takes control of the bus and starts 
transmitting. As the time required to transmit frame 2 is higher than the duration of the 
minislot, this will cause the minislot to expand. 
 
 
Figure 3.13 - Minislot expansion 
Therefore, the dynamic segment has no time left for transmitting frame 4, which must be 
transmitted within the next dynamic cycle.  
3.6.4  Symbol Window 
The symbol window is used for the transfer of specific protocol messages, denominated 
symbols. 
3.6.5  Network Idle Time 
The network idle time is as long as the remaining time between the sum of the static 
segment, dynamic segment and the symbol window lengths until the communication cycle 
time is achieved. Clock synchronization between nodes is performed during this time. To 
reduce network's wasted time, this field must be kept as minimum as possible. The minimum 
value permissible for this segment takes into account the maximum clock deviations that 
might occur between nodes.  
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3.6.6  Flexray Frame 
The Flexray frame is composed by three main sections: the header, payload and trailer 
segments. Figure 3.14 depicts the structure of a Flexray frame. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14 - Flexray frame [42] 
3.6.6.1  Header Segment 
The header segment is composed by the following bits/sections: 
 
 Reserved bit - reserved for future developments of the protocol. 
 
 Payload preamble indicator bit - in static frames this bit signals whether the 
payload field contains a network management vector at its beginning. In case of 
dynamic frames, it is used to indicate the presence of a message ID in the 
beginning of the payload field. This bit is set to zero when none of the mentioned 
data is present.  
 
 Null frame indicator bit - indicates whether the payload field contains data or 
not.  In case that the payload field is empty this bit is set to zero. In case that the 
payload field contains useable data, it is set to one. The null frame indicator bit 
serves as a way of providing the receiving nodes with information such as whether 
the transmitting node had its data ready at the time of transmission of the frame 
or not. 
 
 Sync frame indicator bit - is set to one if the frame is a synchronization frame 
and is set to zero in the case that the frame is not a synchronization frame.  
 
 Start-up frame indicator bit - in case that the transmitted frame is a startup 
frame, this bit is set to one. Startup frames are only sent by nodes during cold 
start. The startup mechanism is not described in this document due to its 
specificity. More information on the startup mechanism can be found in [42]. 
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 Frame ID - identifies the content and sender of the frame. Each communication 
slot has a frame ID associated to it. Hence, it is not allowed for nodes to share the 
same frame IDs. 
 
 Payload length  field - carries the number of words (sets of 16 bits) in the 
payload field. Since the maximum number of bytes in the payload field is 254, this 
section comprises 7 bits. 
 
 Header CRC - contains the CRC code calculated taking as basis the bits comprised 
between the sync frame indicator until the end of the payload length field.  
 
 Cycle count - the cycle count field contains the number of the communication 
cycle viewed from the transmitting node's perspective.  
3.6.6.2  Payload Segment 
The payload segment contains the data to be transferred in the frame. It can contain 
from 0 to 254 bytes of data. Due to the fact that the payload length field specifies the 
number of bytes to be carried as a mean of words, the payload segment always carries an 
even number of bytes. 
 As it was mentioned in previous sections, the first bits of this section can either contain 
the network management vector in case of frames transmitted in the static section or the 
message ID, in the case of a dynamic frame. The inclusion of a message ID on the payload 
field permits nodes to filter data based on the contents of this field. 
3.6.6.3  Trailer Segment 
The trailer segment contains a 24 bit CRC code for fault detection. A particular note on 
the effectiveness of this code must be taken into account as the hamming distance offered by 
this code depends on the length of the payload field. For payload fields which length is less or 
equal to 248 bytes, the hamming distance offered by the CRC code is 6 whether in the case 
that the payload length is higher than 248 bytes, the hamming distance offered is 4. 
 
3.6.7  Error Processing,  Management and Transmission Security 
3.6.7.1  Bus guardian 
The bus guardian is a device which monitors the communication channels. It is 
independent from the communications controller and grants extra reliability to the system. 
By knowing the frame schedule of the static section, it is able to detect if nodes erroneously 
try to access the bus on instants where they are not allowed to. Upon detection of such 
situations, the bus guardian can disable the bus drivers and notify the controller.  
3.6.7.2  CRC codes 
The CRC code mechanism is described on Section 3.5.5.3. 
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3.6.7.3  Dual Channel Transmission  
The multichannel ability of the Flexray protocol is able to provide even more reliability 
and fault tolerance to the system if the same data is carried on both communication 
channels. Safety critical systems might not be able to withstand the failure of the 
communication network. By having two distinct communication channels carrying the same 
data, the interruption of one of the communication channels is compensated by the non 
faulty channel. In case of transient faults, the redundant transmission channel is able to 
deliver the affected frames correctly.  
The delay of one of the communication channels allows an enhancement in fault 
tolerance. Figure 3.15 depicts an example where frames are being transmitted with a delay 
under the occurrence of a transient fault in both communication channels.  
 
 
Figure 3.15 - Message delay in a two channel Flexray network 
Due to the imposed delay, the error caused two different sections of the frame on each 
channel to be corrupted. Hence, it is possible to reconstruct the transmitted frame by 
utilizing the segments that have not been affected by the transient error.   
3.7  Local Interconnect Network (LIN) 
Different features demand for different network requirements. Vehicle systems mainly 
belonging to the powertrain and chassis domain demand high bitrates accompanied by 
powerful error detection and recovery mechanisms, as the processing of a miss value can lead 
to serious consequences. Because of its non criticality and low time constraints, some systems 
do not require the amount of functionalities and speeds that CAN or Flexray can offer. 
Furthermore, by implementing such functionalities in a system that does not require them, 
and given the fact that these functionalities are naturally associated with higher costs due to 
extra hardware/software components, the overall price of vehicles is raised without any 
added value. In order to overcome this issue, a group of vehicle manufacturers got together 
and formed the LIN consortium, with the objective of creating a low cost network for 
supporting the mecatronic elements of  a vehicle such as doors, windows, heating, seating 
adjustment among others [39].  
Local Interconnect Network (LIN) is master-slave network able to achieve bit rates up to 
20 Kb/s. Its concept of operation is based on the introduction of tasks. The master node 
contains a master and a slave task, while slave nodes only contain slave tasks. 
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Many of the details presented in the LIN specification package are not discussed in this 
section. More information is found in [44]. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16 - LIN as a sub-bus of CAN [38] 
 
 
3.7.1  LIN Frames 
LIN frames are composed of two main sections: the header and the response field. The 
two sections are separated by a response space. The header is transmitted by the master 
task, while responses are provided by slave tasks.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.17 - LIN frame [44] 
LIN frames are composed of the following fields: 
 
 Break field - composed of at least 13 dominant bits and serves to signal all nodes 
that a frame transfer is about to start. This field is delimited by one recessive bit 
and is always transmitted by the master node. 
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 Synchronization field - enables nodes which use automatic baud rate detection 
to perform synchronization with the master node. In this section the master 
outputs the value 0x55 (1010101) so nodes can measure bit time through a 
capture counter and adjust their baudrates accordingly. 
 
 Identifier - composed of 10 bits: 1 start bit, 6 identifier bits, 2 parity bits and 1 
recessive delimiter bit. The identifier bits make it possible to address 64 possible 
messages. However, addresses 60 and 61 are reserved for diagnostic data, address 
62 for user defined extensions and 63 for future protocol enhancements. Parity 
bits provide the header with a basic fault detection mechanism with 2 hamming 
distance. The aggregation of the identifier and the parity bits is denominated the 
protected identifier. 
 
 Data field - consists of up to a maximum 8 bits of data. It is outputted by slave 
tasks in response to a given identifier.  
 
 Checksum - transmitted by the slave after the data field. It serves as the fault 
detection mechanism for the data field. Upon arrival of the frame, the master 
calculates the checksum in the same way and compares with the received value 
to check for errors.  
3.7.1.1  Types of LIN Frames 
Despite that the structure of all frames is the same, the following types of frames are 
listed in the LIN specification: 
 
 Unconditional  
 Event triggered 
 Sporadic 
 Diagnostic 
 User-defined 
 Reserved 
The difference between frames types resides in the timing and content of the data. 
Unconditional, event triggered and sporadic frames have particular bus access mechanisms 
that are referred in Section 3.7.2. 
3.7.2  BUS Access 
The LIN protocol follows a master-slave approach. Slaves are not allowed to transmit 
unless prompted. The determinism of the LIN protocol arises due to the fact that all of the 
communication in the bus is controlled by the master.  Following its schedule table, when the 
master intends to cause a slave task to transmit a particular message, it outputs an header 
whose ID is associated with that message.  
By analyzing the header's identifier and upon a positive parity check, each slave task 
determines whether if it is a publisher or subscriber of that particular ID. In case that the 
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slave task is a publisher, it outputs a response. In the case that it is a subscribers, it listens to 
the bus so the information can be processed. 
 
 
Figure 3.18 - LIN bus access [44] 
The master itself can send messages (responses) to other slaves. That is achieved by 
placing a slave task in the master node. The slave task captures the header provided by the 
master task and outputs its response. 
3.7.2.1  Unconditional Frames Transfer 
Unconditional frames are the data carrying frames. Figure 3.19 depicts an example of 
three different situations upon the transfer of unconditional frames: 
 
 
Figure 3.19 - Unconditional frames transfer [44] 
 
1. Frames transfer between slave to master -  the master outputs the header whose 
identifier triggers the slave response. Upon reception of the header, slave 1 identifies 
itself as the publisher of the data and replies with the appropriate data. 
 
2. Frames transfer between master to slaves - the master outputs an header whose 
identifier triggers the response from its own slave task 
 
3. Frames transfer between slaves - the master outputs a header which will trigger 
slave 1 to be the subscriber of the message and slave 2 to be the publisher. Upon 
transmission of the frame by slave 2, slave 1 will capture and process the transmitted 
data. 
3.7.2.2  Event Triggered Frames Transfer 
Figure 3.20 illustrates an example of an event triggered transfer. The purpose of event 
triggered frames is to save bandwidth. This is achieved by associating multiple slave tasks to 
the same ID. In case that an event has occurred in a particular slave, it sends its protected ID 
(the ID which would be sent to query an unconditional frame) in the first data byte, so the 
master task can identify the node where the event has occurred.  
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Figure 3.20 - Event triggered frames transfer [44] 
In case that two slaves had received an event and start transmitting simultaneous in 
response to the master's header a collision occurs, leading to an error. Then, according to 
slave priorities, the master queries them for unconditional frames.  
3.7.2.3  Sporadic Frames Transfer  
Although event-triggered frames might seem sporadic, the query from the master comes 
in a periodic schedule. Sporadic frames are used to embed a dynamic behavior in the 
network. Hence, sporadic headers are only sent by the master when new data was updated. 
3.7.2.4  Diagnostic, User Defined and Reserved Frames 
Bus access of diagnostic, user defined and reserved frames is similar to the bus access of 
unconditional frames. In these kind of frames, only the content of the ID and data changes.  
3.7.3  Error Processing and Management 
Error detection is handled by slave tasks. It consists of analyzing frame structure, parity 
bits and checksum. Upon detection of an erroneous frame, the processing of that frame is 
aborted. 
 Each slave is provided with a status bit named Response_Error. Nodes set the 
Response_Error bit to logical one upon detection of transmission or reception errors in 
response fields. The value of this bit is sent to the master slave periodically in one of the 
transmitted frames and cleared after transmission. In this way, the master gets to know some 
information about the status of a node. In the case that a node does not reply, it is assumed 
that a serious error has occurred. 
Due to the fact that slaves are unable to transmit data unless prompted, the signaling of 
errors is uniquely done after a diagnostic header has been sent by the master.  
3.8  Time Triggered Ethernet (TTEthernet) 
The application of Ethernet in vehicles is an interesting solution mainly due to its cost 
effectiveness and high bandwidth, which can reach up to 10 Gb/s, an exuberating value 
compared to the bitrates offered by the other discussed protocols throughout this chapter. 
 Ethernet's original objective was the connection of multipurpose computers in local 
networks. Being designed in CSMA/CD approach, it does not grant in any way that a particular 
node will be able to access the transmission medium in order to perform a transmission. Time 
constraints, determinism or fault tolerance were aspects not taken into consideration upon its 
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design. Therefore, in its original form, Ethernet is not able to fulfill the requirements that 
support its integration in vehicle control systems. 
TTEthernet expands the classical Ethernet to meet these requirements [45]. It achieves 
this by generating services on top of unchanged Ethernet. The concept behind TTEthernet is 
the transformation of messages from higher layer protocols into time-triggered messages 
without changing its content. Therefore, it can be said that TTEthernet concerns only the 
instants when these messages are sent. 
TTEthernet permits that messages with different levels of determinism can coexist in the 
same network. It is possible for strict control data to be placed in the same network with 
media data, which does not require strict determinism but instead a defined maximum 
latency, or even webservices in a best effort scheme, where determinism is not required at 
all. Furthermore, it may achieve this while granting high levels of reliability and fault 
tolerance.  
3.8.1  Operational Principles and Architectures 
TTEthernet's basic architecture assumes the star form, in which a router is the central 
element. Multiple stars can be cascaded, even with segments with different bandwidths. 
Redundancy, which is discussed in Section 3.8.3 can also be implemented in order to achieve 
extra reliability and fault tolerance.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21 - TTEthernet redundant architecture [45] 
 
Switches act as the core of the protocol, being responsible for the organization of 
incoming frames and posterior transmission in the appropriate instants, according to the 
predefined schedule. 
The transmission of time-triggered (TT) messages requires a common sense of time 
between the interacting nodes. This implies that  all nodes involved in the transmission and 
reception of time triggered frames must be synchronized. The synchronization process is 
quite extensible for the matters of this work and a detailed explanation of it can be found in 
[46].  
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Upon reception of scheduled time-triggered messages, switches immediately route frames 
to the respective network segment. Due to the fact that the transmission of these messages is 
scheduled offline, in error free operation the output transmission segment is always free. 
Rate constrained (RC) messages are routed immediately if no TT messages are awaiting to 
be transmitted, and best effort (BE) messages take the remaining bandwidth. Switches have 
buffers for each kind of messages. In the case of high network load, the switch can notify the 
sending nodes that its buffer is full.  
3.8.2  Types of Messages 
There are three different kinds of messages that may be exchanged in TTEthernet which 
are presented as follows. 
3.8.2.1  Time Triggered Messages (TT messages) 
TT messages are messages sent by nodes at predefined instants. These messages have the 
maximum priority over the other types of messages, and used for exchanging strict 
deterministic control data. 
3.8.2.2  Rate Constrained Messages (RC messages) 
Not all control data requires strict determinism. A limited delay and temporal deviation 
can be enough to fulfill some applications' requirements. RC messages are used to carry these 
messages, which can vary from automotive applications with moderate timing requirements 
to multimedia data. The transfer of RC messages is not synchronized taking as basis a 
common schedule. Hence it is possible that different nodes transmit these messages at the 
same point in time, which may lead to queues on the switching devices, which will result in 
jitter. 
3.8.2.3  Best Effort Messages (BE messages) 
Best effort messages are the classical Ethernet messages. These messages do not rely in 
any of the services provided by TTEthernet and have the lowest value of priority comparing to 
the other kind of messages described. There is not an upper boundary on the time that will 
take for a message of this kind to get to the destination, or even it will actually get there. 
Best effort messages are transmitted in free network times between transmission of TT and 
RC messages, thus optimizing the use of bandwidth. 
 
3.8.3  Reliability and Fault Tolerance 
Being the central element in the network topology, switches have the ability to behave 
like bus guardians. Due to the fact that these are directly connected to nodes, errors can be 
detected and appropriate measures can be taken, such as disabling of communication drivers 
of the erroneous node or the masking of the error, depending on whether redundancy is 
present or not.  
The network structure can be designed to accommodate the desired level of reliability 
and fault tolerance. This can be achieved by adding redundancy to the switch and to the 
communication channels in each node. Figure 3.22 depicts an example of a network structure 
offering three redundancy channels.  
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Figure 3.22 - TTEthernet multiple redundant channels [45]
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Chapter 4  
Drive-by-wire systems and guidelines for 
fault tolerant hardware design 
4.1  Motivation for this Chapter 
At the present moment, no vehicle available in the market employs a full by-wire scheme. 
Given the importance that this subject will have on the next generation of vehicles, some of 
the concepts behind this philosophy are presented in this chapter. The development of safety 
critical systems is complex and requires a profound study on the matter. However, it is 
possible for students to build simple dependable systems by exploring the concepts and ideas 
presented in this section.  
4.2  Introduction to Drive-by-wire Systems 
The first vehicles in the market were entirely dependent on the use of mechanical and 
hydraulic components. The introduction of electronic components in these systems, allowed 
major improvements in the automotive industry in terms of safety, economy and comfort.  
X-by-wire is the designation of a field of studies that has the ultimate goal of replacing all 
mechanical transmission linkages by communication networks and mechanical actuators by 
electrical actuators [47]. The reduction of mechanical components in vehicles allows for new 
vehicle designs due to an increase of available space, lower maintenance, decrease assembly 
time and improve safety, as mechanical components like for instance the steering column are 
a potential deadly element to the driver in case of impact [48].   
X-by-wire systems are gradually being introduced in a two stage process. The first stage is 
the introduction of x-by-wire systems in which mechanical backup systems are automatically 
activated in the event of erroneous operation. The control units that operate such systems 
must possess self checking mechanisms that are able to detect errors. Such units are named 
fail-silent units (FSU). The second stage of the implementation of x-by-wire systems is their 
integration without mechanical backup. By having no mechanical backup, these systems must 
be fault tolerant. As it will be seen, fault tolerance is achieved by means of component 
redundancy. Multiple FSUs working together form a fault-tolerant unit (FTU). 
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Figure 4.1 - Citroen C5 by wire: acceleration and braking integrated in the steering wheel [48] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 - General Motors  Hy-wire concept car [49] 
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Figure 4.3 - Fault tolerant architecture [50] 
Throttle-by-wire is already a reality in vehicles sold nowadays, as vehicle's modern 
engines are fully electronically controlled. There is no mechanical connection between the 
throttle pedal and the engine. Instead, sensors determine the throttle pedal position and an 
electronic unit commonly known as Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) actuates on the throttle 
based on other variables such as engine RPM, engine load, vehicle speed, temperature, 
atmospheric pressure among others. This permits an enhanced engine control resulting in 
greater performance and optimized fuel consumption which would be impossible in any other 
way, due to the fact that the driver as a human being is unaware of these variables [51]. 
Furthermore, the implementation of throttle-by-wire in the automotive industry permitted 
systems such as the ESC, TCS or cruise control to be implemented.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 - ETC mechanism in internal combustion engines [52] 
 
The absence of connection between the driver's inputs and the actuators in x-by-wire 
systems removes the so called "road feel", required for the accurate control the vehicle. 
Hence, haptic actuators are usually added to emulate the sensations that the driver would 
have in a non by-wire system. The concept of haptic feedback can be further explored, as a 
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synergy with other systems such as radars or cameras can be made to detect potentially 
dangerous situations and increase the driver's responsiveness and perception.  
4.2.1  Obstacles on the Implementation of Drive-by-wire Systems 
Braking and steering systems are good candidates to follow the "by-wire" trend. However, 
there are several objections in their way. Both the braking and steering systems are safety 
critical due to the fact that a faulty operation of one of such systems can lead to a loss of 
control of the vehicle, which can have devastating consequences. Moreover, pure drive-by-
wire systems do not have safe states. Therefore, brake-by-wire and steer-by-wire systems 
must ensure high dependability. As it will be seen, this is achieved by means of component 
redundancy, which results in more complex systems, with higher development times and 
consequently in higher prices. 
 Currently, all the systems in vehicles are manufactured to operate at 14 Volt, the 
industry standard for automotive power buses. With the increase of electronic systems in 
vehicles, the current demanded to the batteries for the vehicle's operation is reaching 
intolerable levels [50]. For instance, if brake-by-wire systems are implemented in a 14 Volt 
bus and a high brake force is demanded, currents on the bus can reach astonishingly high 
values.  
Convincing drivers that drive-by-wire systems are safe is another issue that manufacturers 
face, as people worry about possible electronic malfunctions that might lead to catastrophic 
consequences [53].  
Despite all the referred drawbacks, there are plenty of research groups working in order 
to overcome the referred problems at is believed that the drive-by-wire will eventually 
become a de-facto solution in the market. 
4.3  Drive-by-wire Systems 
4.3.1  Brake-by-wire 
In a brake-by-wire system the brake pedal is not directly connected to the brake 
actuators. Instead, the brake pedal position is sensed, and according to its position the brake 
ECU determines the amount of braking force on each wheel, taking as basis the features 
described on Chapter 2, and commands the actuators to develop the corresponding braking 
force. 
 In conventional vehicles, the braking features described in Chapter 2 work in parallel 
with the main hydraulic circuitry. By integrating them in a brake-by-wire topology, further 
results can be achieved, such as the improvement of stability and brake control due to use of 
electric motors to provide the braking force. Moreover it allows an easier implementation of 
systems such as the ABS, ESC or TCS, and the elimination of environmental concerns due to 
the removal of the hydraulic fluid [54]. Furthermore, the vibration caused in the brake pedal 
of conventional braking systems upon the actuation of the ABS is removed. 
Two different types of brake-by-wire systems are discussed in this section. 
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4.3.1.1  Electro Hydraulic Brakes (EHB) 
Electro hydraulic brakes are the first evolution of conventional brakes to brake-by-wire 
systems. These systems cannot be called pure by-wire systems, due to the fact that a backup 
hydraulic connection between the brake pedal and the hydraulic modulator exists, and is 
enabled in the case of erroneous operation of the brake ECU. 
 The brake force is generated by hydraulic means, but lacks the direct connection 
between the brake pedal and the hydraulic modulator under normal operation.  Signals from 
the brake pedal sensors travel to the brake ECU, which determines the appropriate brake 
value on each wheel taking as basis the braking features described in Chapter 2. The 
determined braking values for each wheel are transferred to the hydraulic control unit (HCU), 
which actuates the hydraulic circuits to generate the desired braking force [50]. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - Electro hydraulic brakes scheme [50] 
4.3.1.2  Electro Mechanical Brakes (EMB) 
Electro mechanical brakes reflect the pure concept of x-by-wire systems due to the fact 
that a mechanical connection between the brake pedal and the brake actuators is absent. 
The EMB operation is similar to the EHB but, instead of transmitting the brake signals to the 
HCU, the brake ECU transmits braking forces by wire to individual wheel brake modules 
placed on each wheel, which have the task of providing the determined brake force by means 
of electro-mechanical actuators. A scheme of electro mechanical brakes can be found in 
Figure 4.6:  
 
 
Figure 4.6 - Electro mechanical brake-by-wire [50] 
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Figure 4.7 - Continental electro mechanical brake [55] 
4.3.2  Steer-by-wire 
Steer-by-wire expands the by-wire concept to the vehicle's steering system. Hence, no 
mechanical connection between the steering wheel and the tires exist.  
Sensors placed in the steering wheel transmit its position and torque to an ECU which in 
turn actuates electric motors in the front axle to steer the wheels. A unit called hand wheel 
actuator is responsible for providing the haptic feedback to the driver [56].  
4.4  Fault Tolerant Hardware Architectures Design 
Many of the systems described along this document are safety critical. Being safety 
critical means that the failure or malfunction of such systems can lead to potential 
catastrophic situations such as the death of people, significant damage or loss of equipment, 
and environmental harm [57]. Hence, it must be assured that these systems grant appropriate 
levels of dependability, the level of confidence in which the system can be expected to 
perform its functions.  
The brief discussion of the development of safety critical systems that follows takes as 
basis the standard IEC 61508 which addresses multipurpose safety related systems. ISO 26262 
is a standard that is currently being developed uniquely for the automotive industry based on 
IEC 61508. Given the fact that ISO 26262 standard is not yet available [58], the classifications 
that follow are based on IEC 61508. 
The development of safety critical systems starts by the analysis of the ways in which the 
target system can be the source of hazards. Hazards can be defined as situations that have 
the potential to cause harm to people or the environment. There are several methodologies 
that aid the identification of the events that lead to hazards and their consequences such as 
the FMEA (failure modes and events analysis), ETA (event tree analysis), FTA (fault tree 
analysis) among others [57]. Once the sequences of events that lead to hazards are 
determined, the frequency of occurrence of each hazard can be calculated. 
The frequency of each hazard combined with its consequences make up what is called 
risk. IEC 61508 provides the classification for both the consequences, frequency and 
associated risk of hazards. 
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Table  4.1 - Risk classification according to IEC 61508 
Consequences 
Frequency Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
Frequent I I I II 
Probable I I II III 
Occasional I II III III 
Remote II III III IV 
Improbable III III IV IV 
Incredible IV IV IV IV 
 
Table  4.2 - Interpretation of the various risk levels according to IEC 61508 
Risk class Interpretation 
I Intolerable risk 
II Undesirable risk, and tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if 
the costs are grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained 
III Tolerable risk if the cost of risk reduction would exceed the improvement 
gained 
IV Negligible risk 
 
Risk classification serves as basis for the determination of a safety integrity level. Safety 
integrity levels reflect the level of dependability of safety systems and condition not only the 
system's architecture but its development process.  
 IEC 61508 provides target failure rates for the four proposed integrity levels according to 
different modes of operation: a continuous mode and a low demand mode. As an example, 
the braking system would be considered for the continuous mode operation SIL levels, while 
the airbag system would be considered for the demand mode of operation. The classification 
on the continuous mode of operation takes as basis the number of failures per hour, while the 
on demand mode of operation takes as basis the probability of the system not to respond 
appropriately to the request. 
 
Table  4.3 - IEC 61508 safety integrity levels for continuous mode of operation 
Safety Integrity Level Failures per hour 
4 10−8 to 10−9 
3 10−7 to 10−8 
2 10−7 to 10−6 
1 10−5 to 10−6 
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Table  4.4 - IEC 61508 safety integrity levels for on demand mode of operation 
Safety Integrity Level Failures per hour 
4 10−4 to 10−5 
3 10−3 to 10−4 
2 10−2 to 10−3 
1 10−1 to 10−2 
 
 
IEC 61508 provides three different methods for determining the appropriate SIL level for 
an application, however the discussion of these methods go beyond the objectives of this 
document.  
The main question to keep in mind is that safety critical systems must grant determined 
levels of safety so they can be trusted. Moreover, systems which are safety critical and were 
not designed with safety critical requirements, are not likely to offer the desired 
dependability. Therefore, it is necessary to increase their dependability, so the risks 
associated with the equipment malfunction are reduced to tolerable levels. 
4.4.1  X-by-wire Requirements for the Automotive Industry 
The x-by-wire consortium issued a report in 1998 titled "Safety Related Fault Tolerant 
Systems in Vehicles". Section 3.6 of the report refers to the safety requirements that x-by-
wires shall obey. The referred requirements apply to steer-by-wire systems, but can serve as 
the basis for the development of other drive-by-wire systems. The following marks are a 
transcription with minor adaptations of the points discussed in that section [59]: 
 
 Systems shall not lead to a state in which human life, economics or environment 
are endangered 
 In the presence of faults, it is required that the system is at least able to tolerate 
one major critical fault without loss of the functionality, for a time long enough 
to reach a safety parking area 
 There must be a provision to maintain safe (reduced) operation for a limited 
period 
 A single failure of the system must not lead to a fault of the whole system 
 Each of the subsystems input, process and output must be fault tolerant by itself 
 Reduced functionality in the case of a failure is permissible as long as there is no 
risk to the safety of the driver or other traffic participants 
 In case of non critical faults, the system shall maintain the full operational state 
but has to advise the driver 
 The system must memorize the error codes of intermittent faults for 
maintenance  
 The systems must provide information about their internal status (example: stop 
immediately, service required or correct operation) 
 The probability of encountering any of the safety-critical failure modes shall not 
exceed 5 × 10−10 per hour per system 
 
  
Fault Tolerant Hardware Architectures Design 77 
 
 
 
By the analysis of these requirements it can be concluded that automotive drive-by-wire 
systems must be highly dependable. In fact the integrity level required for x-by-wire systems 
is even higher than SIL 4, the highest integrity level referred on IEC 61508. 
4.4.2  Increasing Dependability 
The two most common ways of increasing a systems' dependability are: fault avoidance 
and fault tolerance [60]. 
4.4.2.1  Fault Avoidance 
Fault avoidance is based on the concept of ensuring quality in all aspects: system design, 
components and their protection such as electromagnetic interference (EMI) shielding and 
system maintenance. The amount of extra dependability provided by fault avoidance methods 
is somewhat limited to the demands of safety critical systems [60].  
4.4.2.2  Fault Tolerance 
Given the fact that any element despite of its quality will eventually fail, fault tolerance 
mechanisms must be employed to ensure that no fault can result in system failure, as 
required by drive-by-wire design requirements. Fault tolerance is achieved by means of 
redundancy. The objective of redundancy is that the overall system to achieve higher 
reliability than the parts that compose it, and the elimination of single points of failure [60]. 
There are three different kinds of hardware redundancy: static, dynamic, and hybrid 
redundancy [57]. Static and dynamic redundancy are usually applied in drive-by-wire systems 
and therefore are discussed in this section.  
The discussion on hybrid redundancy is left behind as it is mostly used in the aircraft 
industry. Hybrid redundancy reflects the combination between static and dynamic 
redundancy. Despite achieving the best results in terms of reliability, it usually requires a 
large amount of components and high complexity.  
The following examples of architectures reflect simplifications of the questions involved. 
A more detailed approach on a solution for a brake-by-wire system is given in Chapter 5. 
Static Redundancy 
Static redundancy uses fault masking as its basic principle. It consists on having several 
elements performing the same functions in parallel and a voting mechanism which is 
responsible for outputting a single value out of the values provided by the units in parallel. 
Static redundant systems do not perform reconfiguration upon faults. The voting 
mechanism can either be another device or the process itself.  
N-modular Redundancy (NMR) Architectures 
N-modular redundancy reflects the general concept of static redundancy. These 
architectures are constituted by N odd elements in parallel. In order for the voter to find an 
agreement, this system has to be built with at least three working units. This system is able 
to tolerate failures within 
𝑁−1
2
 different modules. 
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Figure 4.8 - N modular redundancy  
It should be noted that although in Figure 4.8 the voter is itself a single point of failure, 
to achieve fault tolerance the voter itself needs to be replicated. 
The output of a voter can be computed in several ways such as the majority, median, 
mean among others.  
Figure 4.12 depicts this philosophy applied in the acquisition of the steering wheel 
position. Three sensors are working in parallel (Triple Modular Redundancy) and the steering 
controller performs voting over the three values provided by the sensors.  
The voter can also be the process itself, as Figure 4.9 depicts. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 - Static redundancy applied to steer-by-wire  
Figure 4.9 illustrates this concept applied to a steer-by-wire system by adding three or 
more motors in series to control the steering torque. In the event of failure of one of the 
steering actuation modules, the system would operate in a degraded mode but it would be 
possible to control the vehicle and lead it to a safe state. 
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Dynamic Redundancy 
Static redundant systems rely on a high number of parts to achieve fault masking, which 
can lead to intolerable costly solutions. On the other hand, dynamic redundant architectures 
rely on fault detection mechanisms and system reconfiguration to employ fault tolerance.  
Despite of requiring more processing power due to required fault detection mechanisms, 
the number of elements required for fault tolerant operation is decreased. In fact, dynamic 
redundancy can be achieved with two units. Under fault free operation, processing spare 
elements do not generate outputs but can either be actively processing information (hot 
standby), or be with limited activity (cold standby).  
Upon detection of a faulty element, the system is reconfigured to substitute the faulty 
element by a spare element. During the reconfiguration phase the processes are uncontrolled, 
hence it must be evaluated if the reconfiguration time can or not lead to potentially 
dangerous situations. The choice whether to use hot or cold standby spare units conditions 
the system's reconfiguration time, which is less in the case of hot standby.  
Standby Spare Architectures 
Standby spares are the most basic form of dynamic redundant architectures. In this 
scheme, only one unit is actively producing outputs. In case that a fault is detected, the 
faulty unit is removed from operation and substituted by a spare element.  
 
 
Figure 4.10 - Standby spare architecture concept 
 
The concept of standby sparing can be applied to the steering motors of a steer-by-wire 
system as the example on Figure 4.12 suggests. In this example the steering control module is 
responsible for controlling motors that steer the wheels. Sensors provide the feedback of the 
motor's behavior into the steering control module. Upon detection of a faulty motor, the 
steering control module de-energizes the faulty motor and controls the spare motor.  
It must be noted however that the steering control module needs itself to be fault 
tolerant with the risk of erroneous commands being sent to the steering motors. 
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Figure 4.11 - Standby sparing applied to steering actuators 
The same idea can be applied to steer-by-wire systems as Figure 4.12 suggests. A steering 
controller is checked by a dedicated unit. Whenever a fault is detected on the active steering 
controller the checker element requests the spare unit to assume control. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 - Standby sparing applied to brake-by-wire 
Pair and Spare Architecture 
Standby spare architectures have a major drawback: if the active unit produces erroneous 
but plausible outputs, the faulty operation might not be detected. Pair and spare 
architectures correct this drawback by having two units working in parallel over the same 
inputs. The outputs are then compared and, if in case of disagreement extra units are called 
to operate. Therefore, pair and spare architectures require at least three units. Although 
more costly due to the extra hardware requirements, this unit grants even higher levels of 
dependability. 
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Figure 4.13 - Pair and spare architecture 
Figure 4.14 depicts the pair and spare philosophy applied to the a set of sensors in a 
brake-by-wire system. Two sensors are actively being compared by the brake controller. 
When the brake controller finds a disagreement between the two active sensors it enables an 
extra sensor, checks which of the active sensors is faulty and excludes it.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 - Pair and spare architecture applied to brake-by-wire 
4.5  Fail Safe Units 
Some systems might not be able to withstand an erroneous operation with the risk of the 
of occurrence of a catastrophic event. In such cases, the erroneous operation must be 
detected and the system must be lead to a safe state.  
The braking and steering features which were discussed in Chapter 2 have the ability to 
cause potentially dangerous situations in case of erroneous operation. An incorrect brake 
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operation by the ABS, TCS or ESC has the potential of affecting the stability of the vehicle. 
Similarly, erroneous steering assistance provided by power steering systems have the 
potential to cause the driver to lose control of the vehicle. Therefore, it must be granted that 
these systems fail in a safe way. Failing in a safe way in systems which have mechanical 
backup is achieved by making computational units to stop producing outputs. Units that 
behave in this way are denominate fail safe units.   
Two main hardware strategies that rely on multiple cores can be applied to detect 
failures and lead the system to  a safe state: a master/checker approach and a comparative 
duplication mechanism.   
4.5.1  Master/checker Approach 
The master/checker approach consists on having a main microcontroller be periodically 
checked by another microcontroller, typically with less computational power for the sake of 
cost saving. Upon detection of erroneous behavior by the checking unit, measures are taken 
to prevent the master from producing outputs. 
4.5.2  Duplication with Comparison 
Duplication with comparison consists on having two microcontrollers performing the same 
operations and comparing the outputs. The two microcontrollers can run the same software 
or employ different software versions, in which case software faults can also be detected. 
 In any case, if the outputs from both microcontrollers do not match, the system is lead to 
a safe state.  
4.6  Hardware for Safety Critical Systems 
As more dependability is being demanded to computational units, manufacturers are now 
offering on-chip solutions to meet the requirements of safety standards [61].  
Some of the most popular features are presented in this section.  
4.6.1  Integrated Voltage Regulators 
Improper voltage fed to the microcontroller can lead to unexpected behavior and 
consequently, to faulty operation. Integrated voltage regulators have the task of feeding a 
constant voltage to the microcontroller components regardless of the voltage fluctuations in 
the source. 
4.6.2  Voltage Monitors 
Voltage monitors supervise the voltage fed to the microcontroller and engage safety 
measures in case of high or low voltage detected. 
4.6.3  Memory Protection Unit (MPU) 
The memory protection unit is a hardware feature that splits the physical memory into 
several slots, and assigns different rights to each of the memory accessing entities (CPU, 
communication interfaces etc..), preventing overlapping, unauthorized access and protecting 
memory sections. 
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4.6.4  Error Correction Code Protected memories (ECC) 
In ECC memories data is stored with additional redundancy so its accuracy can be tested 
when saving or retrieving data from the memory. Several mechanisms can be employed in 
protected memories such as parity bits, duplication codes, checksums, cyclic redundancy 
check codes among others. Some of the coding mechanisms allow corrupt data to be 
recovered, at the cost of higher overhead. 
4.6.5  Clock Monitoring Units 
Clock monitoring units check for deviations on the generated clock frequency. In the case 
that the clock frequency deviates from a determined threshold, safety measures are engaged. 
4.6.6  Peripheral Components Replication 
Component replication enables the outputs from components such as analog to digital 
converters, counters among others to be compared. In case of non matching outputs between 
two redundant units, microcontrollers or special safety related units are signaled so safety 
measures can be carried. 
4.6.7  Watchdog Timers 
Watchdog timers are special safety related timers with the goal of ensuring that the 
supervised unit is actively performing its operations. The supervised unit periodically resets 
the watchdog timer value. In the case that the watchdog reaches its maximum value, which 
may happen in case of erroneous operation in the supervised unit, safety measures such as 
resetting the microcontroller are carried. Watchdog timers are able to detect not only 
hardware lack of response or overload failures but also software faults, in which programs 
may fail to reset the watchdog timer due to erroneous operation. 
4.6.8  Dual Core Microcontrollers for Safety Applications 
In safety dual core microcontrollers the processors and other critical components are 
replicated in order to attain higher integrity levels. Figure 4.15 depicts the block diagram of 
the Freescale MPC564xL microcontrollers family, designed specifically for the needs of 
automotive safety related systems.  
The replicated elements are bounded by redundancy checking units, whose aim is to 
supervise the consistency between the two sets of replicated units. Every time a 
disagreement between the outputs of the replicated modules is observed, the redundancy 
checker signals the fault collection and control unit (FCCU), which in turn enables safety 
measures depending on the nature of the detected fault. 
The processors from dual core microcontrollers can be configured to operate into two 
distinct modes: the lock step mode (LSM) and the decoupled parallel mode (DPM). 
4.6.8.1  Lock Step Mode (LSM) 
In lock step mode the two processors operate synchronously. The same instructions are 
executed at the same by each of the processors. The outputs of both processors are compared 
by hardware and in case of deviation the system is lead to a safe state. 
In this way, failures affecting one of the processors are widely detected and signaled in 
short amounts of time, without any software intervention.   
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4.6.8.2  Decoupled Parallel Mode (DPM) 
In the decoupled parallel mode, processors work independently. Hence, no hardware fault 
detection is possible without the implementation of specific fault detection software. 
Software fault detection mechanisms using the DPM are described in [62]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 - MPC5643L block diagram [63]
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Chapter 5  
Architecture Definition 
In this Chapter, the concepts and ideas explored in previous chapters are put together to 
form a conceptual architecture for the backbone architecture of the vehicle. Afterwards, a 
proposed architecture for the braking system is explored in detail, along with the algorithms 
which support the correct behavior of its hardware elements. 
The objective of the development of the FEUP's EV is not the creation of a vehicle to be 
driven on the public road. Instead, the main goal of this project is the development of a 
vehicle that can be designed and assembled by students taking in consideration the price of 
components and availability, the students learning curve and the knowledge obtained in the 
various courses along their academic career. Therefore, the proposed architecture does not 
include most of the de-facto solutions present in most of the commercially available vehicles. 
Most of the systems described in this document are too complex to be developed by a 
single working group in a reasonable amount of time. In order for this project to be feasible 
by students, the proposed architecture is based on the idea of isolating the boundary of each 
feature up to the maximum degree possible. This means that functionalities that would 
normally share a single ECU (like for instance most of the discussed braking functionalities) 
must be divided to form a network of less complex control units. In this way, students will not 
be restrained on the use of a particular hardware/software platform and are free to make 
their own decisions.  
However, given the fact that multiple dependencies between functionalities and systems 
exist, it is not possible nor practical for all functionalities/systems to be completely 
independent. Several functionalities, such as the TCS which relies both on the brake and 
motor ECUs operate in a distributed fashion. Therefore, in order for the implementation of 
distributed algorithms to be possible, the software specification on each module must include 
a set of services that allow the interaction between ECUs. Global awareness of variables that 
might interest several ECUs should also be provided. These issues should be solved by means 
of appropriate software and middleware specification. 
 Although the main focus of this work is hardware, brief references to software have to be 
made to aid the explanation of concepts behind the proposed architectures.  
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5.1  High Level Architecture 
The following set of requirements were considered for the definition of the proposed 
architecture: 
 
1. Networks interconnecting vehicle systems must be within those which are 
lectured in the students curricular plan, or be congruent with the students 
learning curve 
2. It shall be possible for students to easily integrate their systems with any other 
systems present in the vehicle 
3. The architecture must be scalable 
4. Network components shall be inexpensive 
 
From these requirements, CAN and Ethernet were considered to be viable options to serve 
as the communication backbone for the EV. However, as it is discussed in Chapter 3, CAN's 1 
Mb/s bandwidth might impose limitations on the system's scalability. Hence, to give room for 
the maximum number of systems to be integrated Ethernet shall be used as the 
communication backbone for the EV.  
Figure 5.1 depicts the high level view of the proposed architecture. This architecture 
consists on having the main systems discussed in Chapter 2 connected to each other on a star 
topology by means of an Ethernet switch.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 - High level view of the proposed architecture 
It must be noted however, that if the bandwidth required for the various systems to 
exchange data is less than 1 Mbps, CAN is considered to be a viable solution to serve as the 
backbone for the EV. Instead of a star topology, all the systems would be simply integrated in 
a bus topology. This solution allows for real-time behavior of distributed control algorithms, 
at the cost of requiring a study on the schedulability and CAN priority assignment of all 
frames that are expected to be exchanged. 
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5.1.1  Architecture Limitations 
Ethernet was not tailored to support the exchange of data in real time. Hence, it cannot 
provide the desired level of determinism required for the operation of systems which rely on 
data exchanges between multiple ECUs.  
The fact that that the switch is a central element connecting all ECUs implies that its 
failure will lead to the failure of all the features which rely on data exchanges between 
multiple ECUs. Hence, the failure of the switch will eventually lead to the failure of systems 
such as the ACC, power steering, TCS, ESC, instrument panel among others. In order for this 
issue to be minimized, such systems must be provided with software mechanisms which 
detect the failure of the Ethernet switch and engage safety measures such as vehicle speed 
limitation, so the driver can lead it to a safe state. 
5.1.2  Data Exchange between ECUs 
Certain functionalities require the knowledge of variables that might not be produced 
within the ECU where the feature is implemented. Vehicle's speed for instance, is a variable 
that can be either produced on the motor or brake ECUs and is required by functionalities 
that operate in other ECUs such as steering, lights and instrument panel ECUs.  
A possible solution for this issue that would also allow the integration of additional 
systems with minimum effort, would be the transmission of several variables of interest in a 
publisher/subscriber pattern. This would allow for a scalable solution which permits the 
integration of additional systems that require those variables in a plug-and-play fashion.  
A deep study regarding the functionalities to be implemented must be carried in order to 
determine all the variables of interest to be published. The following tables depict several 
examples: 
 
Table  5.1 - Motor variables of interest 
Variable Potential Subscriber(s) Function 
Vehicle Speed Instrument Panel ECU Vehicle speed display 
Brake ECU Wheel slip detection 
Steering ECU Steering assist force adjustment 
Lights ECU Adaptive Cornering light function 
RPM Instrument Panel ECU RPM display 
Motor Torque Brake ECU Electronic Stability Program, Traction 
Control System 
Motor 
Temperature 
Instrument Panel ECU Motor Temperature Display 
 
Table  5.2- Lights ECU variables of interest 
Variable Potential Subscriber(s) Function 
Lights status Instrument Panel Light Status display 
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Table  5.3 - Brake ECU variables of interest 
Variable Potential Subscriber(s) Function 
ABS, TCS, ESC, EBD and 
BA activity  
Instrument Panel ECU Activity display 
Adaptive Cruise Control Adaptive cruise control disable 
Cruise Control Cruise Control disable 
Brake activity Adaptive Cruise Control Adaptive cruise control disable 
Cruise Control Cruise Control disable 
Brake Diagnostics Instrument Panel ECU Diagnostic Message Display 
Motor ECU Speed limitation upon bad diagnostic 
Yaw Momentum Lights ECU Adaptive Cornering Light Function 
Lateral Acceleration  Lights ECU Adaptive Cornering Light Function 
 
 
Table  5.4 - Steering ECU variables of interest 
Variable Potential Subscriber(s) Function 
Steering Wheel Position Brake ECU Electronic Stability Program 
Lights ECU Adaptive cornering light 
 
5.1.3  ECU Services 
In order for the development of distributed functionalities to be possible, ECUs must be 
accept service requests from other units. Moreover, the existence of services makes it 
possible to enhance functionalities by taking advantage of the cooperation between different 
ECUs. This section provides some examples of services and synergies that can be developed. 
5.1.3.1  Steering ECU 
Yaw Request Service 
Whether the steering system is a power steering or a steer-by-wire system, it is possible 
to generate vehicle yaw momentums by steering the wheels. A service provided by the 
steering ECU that would generate a desired amount of yaw momentum would be valuable for 
enhancing the safety of the vehicle. 
ABS Synergy 
When braking in split friction coefficient surfaces, the ABS induces asymmetrical brake 
forces which induce a yaw moment on the vehicle. 
A synergy between the steering systems and the braking system would enable an 
enhancement on the vehicle's response to the induced yaw. By knowing the braking force on 
each wheel, the induced yaw can be easily calculated. The braking ECU could then request 
the steering ECU to develop a counteracting yaw that would compensate for the ABS induced 
yaw. 
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ESC Synergy 
The effectiveness of the ESC can be further enhanced by taking advantage of the yaw 
generated by the steering system 
Autonomous Driving 
The creation of a yaw generating service would allow the implementation of autonomous 
driving systems such as automatic parking, collision avoidance and autonomous driving.  
 
5.1.3.2  Brake ECU 
Brake Force Request Service 
A brake force request service would allow other control units to request the brake control 
unit to develop a determined brake force. 
Such service is required for the implementation of the adaptive cruise control system. 
Collision avoidance systems automatically actuate the brakes in case of a eminent 
collision. Thus, a brake force request service is also mandatory for the operation of such 
systems. 
Autonomous driving functionalities also require a brake force request service. 
 
5.1.3.3  Motor ECU 
Torque Request Service 
A torque request service would allow ECUs to request a determined torque that would be 
provided by the propulsion system. 
This service is required by the TCS and the ESC.  
Speed Request 
A speed request service enables the definition of a target setpoint speed by other ECUs. It 
is required by the operation of the cruise control, adaptive cruise control and autonomous 
driving systems. 
Speed Limitation 
Upon detection of a critical system failure, a service that would inhibit the driver from 
exceeding a pre determined speed would enhance vehicle safety. For instance, the failure of 
one or more of the wheel braking modules would impose a limitation of the vehicle's speed, 
which would allow the remaining brake modules to compensate more easily for the faulty 
module. 
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5.1.3.4  Lights ECU 
Emergency Light Activation  
An emergency lights activation service would allow a safety enhancement of the vehicle 
and its occupants. Several situations could lead to a request of this service: 
 
 Detection of a critical fault in any of the vehicle's systems, such as 
braking, steering or propulsion systems 
 Emergency braking detected by the BA system 
 Impact detection 
 Collision avoidance system 
 
5.1.3.5  Instrument Panel 
Message Display Service 
This service would offer the possibility of any ECU to display messages to the driver such 
as diagnostics, notifications among others. 
5.2  Braking System Architecture 
This section presents the proposed braking architecture for a brake-by-wire system to be 
developed in the EV project by students.  
Commercial braking systems usually have all of the functionalities described on Chapter 2 
implemented in a single ECU. A braking system encompassing all of the described 
functionalities in a single ECU is considered to be an extremely complex system. Given the 
impracticability of such a system to be developed by a single working group during the 
duration of a semester, it was decided to grant each feature a dedicated control module as 
Figure 5.2 depicts.  
The presented architecture is conceived with the objective that any of the components 
inserted in the architecture, cannot in any way cause the complete loss of the brakes or the 
ability to provoke the loss of vehicle control.  
Due to the fact that all elements belonging to the braking system are safety critical, all 
modules are built with two redundant elements.  
The brake pedal position module is responsible for the acquisition of the brake pedal 
position sensors and the transmission of the brake pedal position over the network to the 
interested entities.  
Each wheel is provided with a brake actuator module, which receives the brake pedal 
position from the brake pedal position module and braking requests from the ABS, TCS and 
ESC modules, and command the actuators to generate the desired braking force. 
The ABS, TCS and ESC modules capture wheel speed values made available by the wheel 
speed acquisition module and the brake pedal position value, compute the required 
interventions and, if necessary transmit braking requests to the brake actuator modules.  
The gateway is the element responsible for providing the interface between the modules 
and exterior systems. It enables outside systems to request braking services (ACC or 
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autonomous driving), and enables modules from the braking system to output diagnostics and 
request services such as torque reduction or speed limitation. 
The internal structure of these modules and several algorithms that grant the appropriate 
behavior of the hardware are discussed with further detail over the next sections. 
The proposed architecture is based on the principle that although the functionalities are 
separated throughout different modules, the entire braking system is seen as one from the 
exterior systems. This is important for the following reasons: 
 
1. The braking system architecture can be modified according to the students' needs 
without having to reconfigure the exterior systems. 
2. It enables the replacement of this architecture with a single chip system that can be 
developed by any student or research group without any modification on the higher 
level network. 
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Figure 5.2 - Braking system architecture 
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5.2.1  Braking Architecture Network Proposal 
When implemented in a single ECU and due to hard real time requirements, braking 
functionalities must be scheduled by a real time operating system. By having them distributed 
into different hardware modules it is not enough to provide a real time operating system for 
ensuring deterministic responses. The communication network must be itself deterministic, 
otherwise it can jeopardize the efficiency of distributed control algorithms and the meeting 
of hard real time deadlines. 
 Choosing an appropriate network for the braking system requires a deep study of each 
individual feature to be carried, so that timing requirements can be specified. Due to the fact 
that this work serves as the first introduction to the EV project, the requirements for these 
systems are not yet known. Therefore, at this moment it is impossible to ensure that the 
proposed networking solution is able to meet the timing requirements of such functionalities. 
Given the impossibility of taking the functionalities' timing requirements into account, the 
specification of the networking solution uniquely considers the feasibility of this architecture.  
As it was discussed in Chapter 3, deterministic, multi-channel and high speed network 
would be required for the braking system, such as Flexray, TTP/C, or TTEthernet. However, 
given its cost and the required time for students to get familiarized with such protocols, it is 
not realistic to propose such solutions. Despite a detailed study on the timing constraints of 
each feature being required, CAN appears to be a good networking solution to be applied in 
this academic project for the following reasons: 
 
 It enables the definition of priorities between messages 
 It is possible to guarantee the scheduling of periodic messages  
 It is taught on the available courses  
 It is present in many low cost microcontrollers available in the market 
 It is a widely adopted solution in the automotive industry for control 
applications - proven efficiency  
 It provides a low cost implementation 
 It is robust 
 
However, safety critical elements cannot be dependent on a single transmission medium, 
as its failure would lead to the loss of the brakes. Therefore, it was decided to provide the 
proposed architecture with redundant transmission mediums.  
 
5.2.2  Gateway 
The internal structure of the gateway is illustrated on Figure 5.3. The gateway is divided 
into three distinct modules: the main element, and elements 1 and 2. Units shall be 
connected internally by means of dedicated transmission channels as Figure 5.3 suggests.  
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Figure 5.3 - Gateway 
The main element is responsible for routing messages between the exterior systems and 
the braking modules, by means of elements 1 and 2.  
Elements 1 and 2 are responsible for providing the interface between the main element 
and the braking system modules. The introduction of elements 1 and 2 prevent that a single 
unit connected to both communication channels can cause both network channels to fail, 
which would result in brake loss.  
5.2.2.1  Routing Messages From Exterior Systems 
Upon arrival of an Ethernet package into the main element, the main element has the 
task of transmitting its content to elements 1 and 2, which in turn will transmit the content 
as CAN messages to the respective CAN channel. All messages transmitted by the main 
element to Elements 1 and 2 shall be provided with error detection mechanisms, to prevent 
that a faulty main element can cause elements 1 and 2 to jam both CAN channels. 
The format of incoming messages from exterior systems can assume two distinct forms.  
The first, consists in embedding CAN messages inside Ethernet frames. This enables the 
main element to extract the CAN frame from the received Ethernet frame, and transmit it 
directly to elements 1 and 2. This approach requires the assignment of CAN identifiers to be 
done globally.  
The second method consists on having transmitters to send data encapsulated into pure 
Ethernet frames. Upon reception of an Ethernet package, the main element is required to 
assign an identifier to the received data according to its content, and transmit it to elements 
1 or 2.  
5.2.2.2  Routing Messages from the Braking Systems 
Due to the fact that not all frames exchanged in channels 1 and 2 are to be delivered to 
exterior systems, elements 1 and 2 require the knowledge of the frames that must be 
delivered to exterior systems, to after transmit them to the main element. 
Messages transmitted by elements 1 and 2 can arrive to the main element in distinct time 
instants. Therefore, a time frame in which messages are considered to be valid must be 
defined. This prevents that a safety procedure might be engaged in case of transient faults. 
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Figure 5.4 -Time frame of messages delivered to the main element 
Upon reception of a frame from elements 1 or 2, the main element shall start counting 
the time frame. If the second frame is received in the mean time or the time window expires, 
the main element proceeds the transmission to the Ethernet segment according to Table  5.5. 
Table  5.5 - Output of the main element according to incoming messages 
Element 1 Element 2 Main element 
Output 
𝐶𝐴 𝐶𝐴 𝐶𝐴 
𝐶𝐴 𝐼 𝐶𝐴 
𝐼 𝐶𝐴 𝐶𝐴 
𝐼 𝐼 𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 
𝐶𝐴 𝐶𝐵 𝐹𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 
 
 
where: 
 
𝐶𝐴 , 𝐶𝐵 : 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒  
𝐼: 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 
 
5.2.3  Brake Pedal Position Module  
The brake pedal position module consists of two elements which operate independently 
and synchronized. Each brake pedal position unit has the task of acquiring the value of a 
redundant set of brake pedal position sensors, compute one value out of the measured values 
by means of a software voting mechanism, and output the brake pedal position to the 
interested entities. The brake pedal position shall be sent periodically, so faults within this 
module can be detected by other units. Despite in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.5 three sensors are 
represented, any number of sensors can be connected to ensure the desired level of 
dependability and any of the techniques presented on Chapter 4 can be applied. 
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Figure 5.5 - Brake pedal position module 
 
5.2.3.1  The Necessity of Synchronism 
If both elements operate unsynchronized it can happen that the sampled value of the 
sensors can differ significantly, as Figure 5.6 illustrates. The faster the driver presses or 
releases the brake pedal, the higher the difference will be. 
 Fault tolerant software mechanisms that operate in the brake actuator modules can 
interpret the difference between both values as a fault, with the aggravation of being unable 
to distinguish which of the elements is providing the erroneous value. In such a situation, the 
brake output module would not be able to perform a correct decision on the brake force to 
produce. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 - Unsynchronized units 
By synchronizing the acquisition time between both units, the system minimizes the 
deviation between the acquired values in both units.   
A Simple Synchronism Method 
A simple synchronism method which can be easily built by students, only requiring two 
digital ports on the microcontroller and two wires connected as Figure 5.7 illustrates.  
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Figure 5.7 - Synchronism diagram 
The synchronism algorithm consists on the idea that each element must expect a change 
on its sync in port after changing its sync out port. After two level changes the two units are 
synchronized. The algorithm is presented on Figure 5.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 - Synchronism algorithm 
If any component of the synchronism mechanism becomes faulty, such as digital ports or 
wires, its operation becomes unavailable. To reduce the negative effects of the lack of 
synchronism between the two elements, the sample rate and network dispatch of each 
element can be raised and safety measures such as speed limitation should be carried. 
5.2.3.2  Plausibility Tests on the Brake Pedal Position 
To avoid erroneous brake pedal values to be transmitted to other modules, plausibility 
tests on the brake pedal position sensors should be performed. Plausibility tests should be 
performed before the voting mechanism, so faulty sensors do not influence the result of the 
brake pedal position. 
This section provides some examples of plausibility tests that can be performed to detect 
faulty sensors 
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Range Testing 
Range testing relies on the fact that the brake pedal position must be within a range of 
plausible values. For instance, if it is considered a depressing value between 0 and 100 
percentage, a negative value or a value above 100 would indicate a erroneous operation. 
Furthermore, if for instance the analog to digital converter responsible for acquiring the 
sensor values with a 10 bit resolution, values higher than 1023 would also indicate a 
erroneous operation. 
Derivative Testing 
Derivative testing relies on the dynamics of the driver pressing the pedal. The pressing of 
a brake pedal follows a natural curve, with a maximum physical variation. If the rate of 
variation is exceeded it might indicate an erroneous value and the value provided by the 
sensor can be excluded. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 - Brake pedal depression dynamics 
Threshold Testing 
A threshold test can be applied for the exclusion of faulty sensors in the following way: 
 
1. Calculate the average/median of all sensor acquisition values 
2. If one sensor differs from a predetermined amount from the average/median, this 
sensor is excluded and marked as faulty 
5.2.3.3  Elements Operation 
The operation of the braking system cannot be dependent on a single brake pedal 
element, as its failure leads to the loss of brakes. Hence, it is advisable to provide each 
element with self checking mechanisms. Whenever it is considered that an element is faulty, 
the driver must be notified and vehicle's speed should be limited. 
It should be noted that as both elements operate independently, it is possible that both 
can transmit different brake pedal positions. However, as it was mentioned, the dynamics of 
a driver pressing or releasing the brake pedal follows a natural curve, and therefore, the 
receiving modules can detect and choose which value is plausible by performing the 
appropriate tests, and after notify the driver and request for vehicle's speed limitation. 
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Figure 5.10 - Fault detection by observation of a plausible brake pedal depression 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the suggested algorithm for the brake pedal position elements 
operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 - Brake pedal position module algorithm 
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5.2.4  Wheel Speed Acquisition Module 
It would not be practical to connect wheel speed sensors to all of the requiring 
functionalities. Therefore, a extra unit named wheel speed acquisition module was added. 
Wheel speed values are made available in the network channels by this module. 
The calculation of vehicle dynamics taking as basis erroneous wheel speeds values may 
affect the stability of the vehicle as the ABS, TCS and ESC systems can perform erroneous 
brake requests taking as basis wrong wheel speed values. Therefore, it must be granted that 
wheel speed values are always correct, or no wheel speed values are transmitted over the 
network.  
Many of the architectures and philosophies presented in Chapter 4 can be used to 
overcome this issue. The simpler method consists on the replication in a duplication with 
comparison topology of the computational elements of the wheel speed acquisition module. 
This method consists on having two redundant units performing the same operations and 
comparing results. If a disagreement between the two units is found, the entire module is 
considered as faulty. Upon this situation, diagnostic messages would be sent by the error 
detecting unit(s) and their operation would be ceased.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 - Wheel speed acquisition module 
 
To ensure that the transmitted wheel speed values are always correct, the wheel speed 
acquisition module should be composed by two elements which compute the values of wheel 
speed sensors at the same instants, perform plausibility tests on the acquired sensor values, 
and exchange the values with the other redundant unit. Congruence tests have to be made to 
check whether the values acquired by both elements are in consonance. This can be done by 
means of threshold tests, which check whether the differences between wheel speeds vary 
from a determined range which is considered faulty. If congruence is verified, a voting 
mechanism is performed between the two units so the same wheel speed values are 
transmitted to the respective CAN channels. 
Similarly to what was discussed for the brake pedal position module, wheel speed sensors 
require redundancy so faults within a sensor can be detected or compensated.  
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In case of disagreement between the results, the module is considered faulty. As the ABS, 
TCS and ESC modules are unable to operate without the knowledge of wheel speed values, 
the driver should be notified. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 - Algorithm for ensuring fail safe behavior of wheel speed acquisition modules 
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5.2.5  ABS, TCS and ESC Modules 
The ABS, TCS and ESC have the ability of causing catastrophic situations by requesting 
erroneous brake services to the actuator modules. Therefore, these units must grant a fail 
safe behavior, which means that upon failure, no brake requests are allowed to be sent by 
these units.  
Similarly to the wheel speed acquisition module, ABS, TCS and ESC modules are 
constituted by two redundant elements which perform the same calculations and compare 
the results before transmitting brake requests. 
However, if both elements would compare the results of a brake force request only when 
an intervention was required, a disagreement in the brake forces to request could be found, 
and no intervention would be outputted. This could result in a dangerous situation in which 
the driver would only be aware on a faulty unit when its intervention would be required. 
Therefore routine checking mechanisms are mandatory. A suggested mechanism which 
can be applied in the ABS, TCS and ESC modules when no intervention is required, consists on 
performing calculations over the received wheel speed values and the comparison between 
the obtained results from both elements. A simple calculation in the form of: 
 
𝐶 =  𝑊𝑆𝐹𝐿 × 𝑘1 + 𝑊𝑆𝐹𝑅 × 𝑘2 + 𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐿 ×  𝑘3 + 𝑊𝑆𝑅𝑅 ×  𝑘4 
 
where: 
 
𝐶: 𝑐𝑕𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 
𝑊𝑆𝐹𝐿 : 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 
𝑊𝑆𝐹𝑅 : 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 
𝑊𝑆𝑅𝐿 : 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 
𝑊𝑆𝑅𝑅 : 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑒𝑙 
𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3 ,𝑘4: 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠  
 
(10.1) 
would allow the detection of a faulty element within the module. 
Figure 5.14 depicts a generic algorithm which will ensure the fail safe operation of the 
ABS, TCS and ESC modules.  
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Figure 5.14 - Algorithm for achieving fail safe operation applicable to the ABS, ESC and TCS systems 
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5.2.6  Braking Actuator Modules 
Braking actuator modules are responsible for receiving braking requests and effectively 
actuate the brakes to generate the required braking force. Brake requests are received 
periodically by the brake pedal module, and sporadically by other units such as the ESC, ABS, 
TCS, ACC and other implemented systems as required. Several brake requests can be sent at 
the same instants by these units. Such issues have to be dealt with appropriate software 
specification. 
5.2.6.1  The Safe State of a Brake Actuator 
The braking actuator modules are responsible for actuating directly on the brake 
actuators. Although it was mentioned in Chapter 4 that a brake-by-wire system does not have 
a safe state, the difference between the safe state of the entire braking system and a single 
brake actuator must be understood.  
When designing fault tolerant architectures, one of the most important things is that its 
safety must be self-sustainable. Thus, during this discussion we exclude the hypothesis of 
intervention from the Electronic Stability Program in case of vehicle destabilization provoked 
by erroneous brake actuation.  
A faulty braking actuator module can cause two distinct situations: performing an 
unsolicited brake force and the contrary, not performing a solicited brake force. The former 
situation can lead to catastrophic situations such as the loss of vehicle control, as the 
creation of an unsolicited brake force creates an undesired yaw moment. In case of  
occurrence of the latter situation, a yaw moment is also generated but with the advantage 
that the effects of a non braking wheel can be detected and compensated. It must be kept in 
mind that brake compensation can only be performed up to a certain brake force. However, if 
we consider that the odds of a brake actuator failing at the same instant that the driver 
performs an emergency braking, the non braking state can be considered the safe state of a 
braking actuator.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.15 - Erroneous operation of the brake actuator 
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5.2.6.2  Braking Actuator Modules Operation 
Similarly to the wheel speed acquisition module,  ABS, ESC and TCS modules, the brake 
actuator modules are constituted by two elements working in a duplication with comparison 
topology. Although both elements perform the same calculations, only one element 
commands the actuator. Upon abnormal behavior from either the actuator or any of the 
elements, the detecting element de-energizes the actuator and engages safety measures.  
A more detailed view of the braking actuator modules and the interacting units is seen on 
Figure 5.16. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16 - Detailed view of brake actuator module connections 
Figure 5.17 depicts an algorithm that ensures the fail safe behavior of the brake actuator 
modules when performing brake requests upon reception of the brake pedal position.  
The algorithm for performing brake request from units such as the ABS, TCS and ESC is 
similar to that described in Figure 5.17, but in case that both elements receive different 
brake requests, the command shall be ignored as this implies that a fault has occurred in the 
ABS, TCS or ESC modules. Upon such situation, a diagnostic message should be sent. 
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Figure 5.17 - Algorithm which ensures the fail safe of brake actuator elements 
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5.2.6.3  Wrap Around Testing 
Once the controller outputs the appropriate signal to generate a certain brake force, it 
cannot be expected that the actuator will actually perform the desired brake force, as faults 
can occur in the actuator and on the interfaces between the controller and the actuator. 
Therefore, it must be tested at all times that the desired brake force is actually being 
generated. This implies that there must any kind of feedback between the controlling and the 
actuating units. On the impossibility of measuring the brake force directly, several indirect 
analytical ways can be performed such as: 
 
1. Measuring the current applied to the actuator (current proportional to torque) 
2. Observing wheel speed when brakes are applied 
 
The suggested algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5.18. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.18 - Algorithm which checks if actuator behavior corresponds to desired behavior 
 
5.2.7  Power Supplies  
The connection of all controllers and actuating units on the braking system to the same 
power supply would result in loss of the brakes in case of power outage. The ideal situation is 
to provide each component of the system  with a dedicated power supply. Due to unfeasibility 
of such idea, due to cost, complexity and available space, and following the same philosophy 
of reducing the number of components on the maximum while granting safety, the minimum 
number of power supplies suggested is two.  
Both elements from the brake pedal position module must be powered by different power 
supplies, as the failure of a single power supply would lead to brake loss, given the inability 
of the brake pedal position to be transmitted to the actuators. 
Due to the fail safe behavior of the ABS, TCS, ESC and wheel speed acquisition modules, 
these can be powered by the same supply, as a power outage on any of the elements will 
cause the whole modules to stop working due to the comparison mechanisms for fault 
detection. 
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To minimize the effects of power outage on vehicle dynamics, brake controllers/actuators 
belonging to the same side of the vehicle cannot be supplied by the same power source. The 
fundaments of this idea can be visualized on Figure 5.19, which depicts undesirable situations 
in all power configurations. 
 Situation 1 reflects a situation that happens upon power outage of the brake actuators 
when two brake actuators from the same side are connected to the same source. In this 
situation, if the driver is pressing the brake pedal and the power supply fails, a yaw 
momentum is generated, which can cause the driver to lose the control of the vehicle. 
Although in situations 2 and 3 the available brake force can be diminished, the failure of 
the power source does not induce an undesired yaw.  
The diagonal configuration on figure two has the potential of providing additional brake 
force comparing to the front/rear power supply configuration. For instance, if the vehicle is 
heavier on its front side, rear wheels cannot perform as much brake force as front wheels. 
Hence, in case of a power outage on the front brake wheels, the available brake force will be 
diminished. In case of the diagonal arrangement, if the front wheel provides more braking 
force and if a steering yaw compensation service is available, the effects of the generated 
yaw can be reduced, while the brake force is increased.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.19 - Different responses from the vehicle according to different configurations of power 
supplies upon power outage 
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5.2.8  Braking System Fault Analysis 
This section provides a brief overview of the types of faults than can occur within the 
braking system, the respective consequences and its effect on brake control. The following 
tables summarize the concepts and ideas that have been discussed throughout this chapter. 
Table  5.6 - Gateway fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Main Element Component fail or power 
outage 
  Braking system unable to interact 
with exterior systems 
 TCS and ESC unable to operate 
No 
Erroneous messages 
transmitted to elements 1 
and 2 
 None: erroneous messages detected 
by elements 1 and 2 and not 
transmitted to braking modules 
No 
Elements 1 or 2 Component fail  None: interaction with exterior 
systems is done by means of non faulty 
element 
No 
Power outage    Braking system unable to interact 
with exterior systems 
 TCS and ESC unable to operate 
No 
 
Table  5.7 - Network channels fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
CAN transmission 
medium 1 or 2  
Communication 
channel mishap 
  None: units are able to 
communicate by means of redundant 
transmission medium 
No 
Network jam by any 
unit connected to the 
channel 
 None: units are able to 
communicate by means of redundant 
transmission medium 
No 
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Table  5.8 - Brake pedal position fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Element 1 or 2  Component fail   None: brake pedal position is 
transmitted by other element 
No 
Erroneous brake pedal 
position transmitted 
 None: receiving modules detect 
erroneous brake pedal position and 
consider the value sent by the 
redundant element 
No 
Power outage  None: brake pedal position is 
transmitted by redundant element 
which is not affected by power 
outage 
No 
Sensors Erroneous value 
provided 
 None: fault detected by plausibility 
tests or natural curve and masked by 
voting mechanism 
No 
 
Table  5.9 - ABS, TCS and ESC modules fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Element 1 or 2  Component fail   Module unable to operate: detected 
by redundant element 
No 
Erroneous brake request 
transmitted  
 Required intervention not performed: 
brake actuator modules detect 
discrepancy between the two received 
brake requests and do not perform any 
intervention (very unlikely due to 
routine checks) 
No 
Power outage  Module unable to operate No 
 
Table  5.10 - Brake actuator modules fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Element 1 or 2  Component fail   Loss of brake force provided by the 
controlled actuator: detected by 
redundant element, which can request 
brake compensation 
Limited 
Power outage   Loss of brake force provided by the 
controlled actuator 
Limited 
Brake Actuator Component fail  Loss of brake force provided by the 
actuator: erroneous behavior detected by 
brake actuator elements and actuator de-
energized 
Limited 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Braking System Architecture 111 
 
 
 
Table  5.11 - Wheel speed acquisition module fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Element 1 or 2  Component fail   ABS, TCS and ESC unable to operate: 
detected by redundant element 
No 
Erroneous wheel speed 
values calculated 
 ABS, TCS and ESC unable to operate: 
detected by redundant element 
No 
Erroneous wheel speed 
values transmitted 
 None: ABS, TCS and ESC modules 
detect discrepancy between the two 
received values 
No 
Power outage   ABS, TCS and ESC unable to operate No 
Wheel speed sensors Erroneous value provided  ABS, TCS and ESC unable to operate No: fault detected 
by plausibility 
tests or natural 
curve and masked 
by voting 
mechanism 
 
 
Table  5.12 - Power supply fault analysis 
Component Fault Consequence Brake loss 
Power Supply Component fail   All elements connected to power supply 
fail 
 Loss of brake force provided by actuators 
powered by the faulty power supply 
Limited 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1  Conclusions 
Throughout this work, several functionalities that are usually found in modern vehicles 
and which have the potential to be developed along the various courses available have been 
identified, and their operation and hardware architectures have been documented. Despite 
the intent of providing this document with more information about the computational 
platforms that are used by manufacturers to implement the described features, the lack of 
information resulting from the fact that such information represent trade secrets, made it 
impossible for providing this document with such data.   
The most widely used communication networks in the automotive industry have been 
studied and documented, which will allow students to understand the concepts and their 
applicability on the projects that will be developed. Although TTEthernet is not actually used 
in the automotive industry, its capabilities and features granted it a spot in this document 
due to its potential of becoming the future solution for the problems that the new generation 
of vehicles will face. 
During this study, it was found that many efforts are being put together by manufacturers 
for the implementation of drive-by-wire systems. Although it was not on the objectives of this 
work, it is my belief that this document would be incomplete without a brief reference to the 
concepts of this emergent philosophy. Not only the drive-by-wire systems were referenced, 
but also some guidelines and techniques that will enable students to develop their own 
solutions. 
The architecture and ideas that were proposed in Chapter 5 for the braking system, 
enables that a system which is usually integrated in a single module to be developed by 
several working groups. Despite being conceptualized taking as basis a network protocol that 
was not designed with the intent of being implemented for safety critical applications, the 
proposed architecture and algorithms that support its operation are able to achieve a fair 
amount of dependability, which is required for a system whose malfunction can lead to 
catastrophic consequences.   
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6.2  Future Work 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 5, Ethernet as a the communications backbone for the EV 
does not guarantee in any way the desired level of determinism which is required for the 
distributed control algorithms that will depend on it. This issue could be solved by the 
creation of a middleware layer that would allow the different systems within the vehicle to 
exchange data in a TDMA scheme, based on the Ethernet infrastructure.  
The proposed architecture for the braking system requires a detailed study on the timing 
requirements of each feature, so the schedulability of all the messages that are expected to 
travel within both CAN channels can be proved.  
Being the EV an academic project, it is expected that the architecture of the systems 
installed will change over time. To avoid constant reconfigurations on the devices that are 
expected to communicate, a middleware layer which would hide the details of the hardware 
architecture would be a valuable asset. 
 115 
 
 
References 
[1] V. Peter, V. Joeri and M. Gaston. "Practical Infrastucture Development For Electric 
Vehicles In Brussels Capital Region". Available: 
http://etecmc10.vub.ac.be/etecphp/publications/evs19vdb2.pdf. Access date: 
January 2011 
[2] U.S. Department of Energy. "Electric Vehicles". Available: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/basics/jtb_electric_vehicle.pdf
. Access Date: Janurary 2010 
[3] M. Eberhard and M. Tarpenning, "The 21st Century Electric Car". Available: 
http://www.veva.bc.ca/wtw/Tesla_20060719.pdf. January 2011. 
[4] European Comission. "The EU climate and energy package". Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/package_en.htm. Access date: January 
2011 
[5] United States Environmental Protection Agency, "Clean Alternative Fuels: Electric 
Vehicles". Available: 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/consumer/fuels/altfuels/420f00034.pdf. Access date: 
January 2011. 
[6] N. Navet and F. Simonot-Lion, "Automotive Embedded Systems Handbook," in Vehicle 
Functional Domains and Their Requirements, 1st Edition, CRC Press, 2009. 
[7] T. Nolte, "Share-Driven Scheduling of Embedded Networks," doctoral dissertation, 
Department of Computer Science and Electronics, Malardalen University, Vasteras, 
Sweden, May 2006. 
[8] C. Kahane and J. Dang, "The Long-Term Effect of ABS in Passenger Cars and LTVs". 
Available http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811182.pdf. Access date: January 
2011. 
[9] W. Ribbens, "Understanding Automotive Electronics," in Vehicle Motion Control, 6th 
Edition, Newnes, 1998. 
[10] A. Mirzaei, M. Moallem, B. M. Dehkordi, and B. Fahimi, "Design of an Optimal Fuzzy 
Controller for Antilock Braking Systems," Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on, 
vol. 55, 2006. 
[11] Robert Bosch, "Automotive Handbook", 5th Edition,Bentley Publishers, 2000. 
[12] A. D. David Burton, Stuart Newstead, David Logan, Brian Fildes, "Effectiveness of ABS 
and Vehicle Stability Control Systems." Available: 
http://www.monash.edu.au/muarc/reports/Other/RACV%20ABS%20braking%20system
%20effectiveness.pdf. Access date: January 2011. 
[13] D. Song, J. Li, Z. Ma, Y. Li, J. Zhao, and W. Liu, "Application of CAN in vehicle 
traction control system," in Vehicular Electronics and Safety, 2005. IEEE International 
Conference, 2005. 
[14] J. Dang, "Statistical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) 
Systems - Final Report". Available: http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810794.pdf. 
Access date: January 2011. 
  
116 References 
 
 
 
 
[15] J. Li and J. Wang, "Research on the automotive EBD system based on fuzzy control," 
in Computer Engineering and Technology (ICCET), 2010 2nd International Conference, 
2010. 
[16] C. Lampton. "How Electronic Brake Force Distribution Works". Available: 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/car-driving-safety/safety-regulatory-
devices/electronic-brake-force-distribution.htm. Access date: January 2011. 
[17] Volkswagen, "The Brake Assist System." Available: 
http://www.volkspage.net/technik/ssp/ssp/SSP_264_d1.pdf. Access date: January 
2011. 
[18] Institute of road safety research, "Speed choice: the influence of human, vehicle, and 
road". Available: http://www.swov.nl/rapport/Factsheets/UK/FS_Speed_choice.pdf. 
Access date: January 2011.  
[19] X. Li, X. Zhao, and J. Chen, "Controller Design for Electric Power Steering System 
Using T-S Fuzzy Model Approach". Available: 
http://www.ijac.net/qikan/manage/wenzhang/2008-066.pdf. Access date: January 
2011. 
[20] K. Nice. "How Car Steering Works". Available: 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/steering2.htm. Access date: January 2011. 
[21] J. Reimpell, H. Stoll, and J. Betzler, "The Automotive Chassis: Enginerring Principles", 
2nd Edition, SAE International, 2001. 
[22] Z. Hui, Z. Yuzhi, L. Jinhong, R. Jing, and G. Yongjun, "Modeling and characteristic 
curves of electric power steering system," in Power Electronics and Drive Systems, 
2009. PEDS 2009. International Conference, 2009. 
[23] A. W. Burton, "Innovation drivers for electric power-assisted steering," Control 
Systems Magazine, IEEE, vol. 23. 
[24] Volkswagen of America, "Electro-mechanical Power Steering". Available: 
http://tos.pp.fi/koukku/892403.pdf. Access date: January 2011. 
[25] C. Min Wan, P. Jun Seok, L. Bong Soo, and L. Man Hyung, "The performance of 
independent wheels steering vehicle(4WS) applied Ackerman geometry," in Control, 
Automation and Systems, 2008. ICCAS 2008. International Conference, 2008. 
[26] D. Wickell. "Facts About Four Wheel Steering". Available: 
http://trucks.about.com/cs/4ws/a/4wheel_steering.htm. Access Date: January 2011. 
[27] M. Gutierrez. "4 Wheel Steering". Available: http://ezinearticles.com/?4-Wheel-
Steering&id=4117270. Access date: January 2011. 
[28] P. Brabec, M. Malý, and R. Vozenílek, "Controls system of vehicle model with four 
wheel steering (4WS)." 
[29] E. Grabianowski. "How the Jeep Hurricane Works". Available: 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/jeep-hurricane2.htm. Access date: January 2011. 
[30] C. Binggang, B. Zhifeng, and Z. Wei, "Research on control for regenerative braking of 
electric vehicle," in Vehicular Electronics and Safety, 2005. IEEE International 
Conference, 2005. 
[31] M. Ehsani, Y. Gao, S. Gay, and A. Emadi, "Modern Electric, Hybrid Electric and Fuel 
Cell Vehicles", CRC press, 2005. 
[32] W. Pananurak, S. Thanok, and M. Parnichkun, "Adaptive cruise control for an 
intelligent vehicle," in Robotics and Biomimetics, 2008. ROBIO 2008. IEEE 
International Conference, 2009. 
[33] "Denso Automotive Products". Available: 
http://www.globaldensoproducts.com/dcs/accs/. Access date: January 2011. 
[34] N. Navet, Y. Song, F. Simonot-Lion, and C. Wilwert, "Trends in Automotive 
Communication Systems," Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 93, 2005. 
[35] S. C. Talbot and R. Shangping, "Comparision of FieldBus Systems CAN, TTCAN, FlexRay 
and LIN in Passenger Vehicles," in Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, 2009. 
ICDCS Workshops '09. 29th IEEE International Conference, 2009. 
[36] T. Hansson and L. Bello, "Implementing Next Generation Automotive 
Communications," Proceedings of the 1st Embedded Real-Time Systems 
Implementation Workshop (ERTSI'04) in conjunction with the 25th IEEE International 
Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS'04), December 2004. 
  
References 117 
 
 
 
[37] G. Cena, A. Valenzano, and S. Vitturi, "Advances in automotive digital 
communications," Computer Standards & Interfaces, Volume 27, Issue 6, June 2005. 
[38] D. Paret, "Multiplexed Networks for Embedded Systems," in Time-Triggered Protocols 
- Flexray, Wiley, 2007. 
[39] T. Nolte, H. Hansson, and L. L. Bello, "Automotive communications-past, current and 
future," in Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation, 2005. ETFA 2005. 10th 
IEEE Conference, 2005. 
[40] CiA, "CAN Specification 2.0 Part B". Available: http://www.can-cia.org. Access date: 
January 2011. 
[41] C. Temple, "Flexray International Workshop Protocol Overview: presentation". 
Available: http://www.flexray.com/products/protocol%20overview.pdf. Access date: 
January 2011.  
[42] Flexray Consortium, "Flexray Communications System Protocol Specification Version 
2.1". Available: http://www.flexray.com. Access date: January 2011. 
[43] Native Instruments, "FlexRay Automotive Communication Bus Overview". Available: 
http://zone.ni.com/devzone/cda/tut/p/id/3352. Access date: January 2011. 
[44] Lin Consortium, "Lin Specification package 2.0". Available: http://www.lin-
subbus.org/. Access date: January 2011. 
[45] TTTech, "TTEthernet - A Powerful Network Solution for All Purposes". Available: 
http://www.tttech.com/fileadmin/content/white/TTEthernet/TTEthernet_Article.pd
f. Access date: 2011. 
[46] TTTech, "TTEthernet Specification". Available: http://wwww.tttech.com. Access 
date: January 2011. 
[47] M. Bertoluzzo, P. Bolognesi, O. Bruno, G. Buja, A. Landi, and A. Zuccollo, "Drive-by-
wire systems for ground vehicles," in Industrial Electronics, 2004 IEEE International 
Symposium, 2004. 
[48] Citroën. "Citroën C5 by wire demonstration vehicle". Available: 
http://www.citroenet.org.uk/passenger-cars/psa/c5/c5bywire.html. Access date: 
January 2011. 
[49] T. Harris. "How GMs Hy-wire Works". Available: http://auto.howstuffworks.com/hy-
wire1.htm. Access date: January 2011. 
[50] F. Seidel, "X-by-Wire". Available: http://osg.informatik.tu-
chemnitz.de/lehre/old/ws0809/sem/online/x-by-wire.pdf. Access date: January 
2011. 
[51] E. A. Bretz, "By-wire cars turn the corner," Spectrum, IEEE, vol. 38, 2001. 
[52] Jason. "NHTSA Says Can't Find Flaw In Toyota Electronic Throttle, Calls AS". 
Available: http://www.torrancetoyotaservice.com/2010/07/02/nhtsa-says-cant-find-
flaw-in-toyota-electronic-throttle-calls-nas/. Access date: December 2010. 
[53] J. Fuller. "How Drive-by-wire Technology Works". Available: 
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/car-driving-safety/safety-regulatory-devices/drive-
by-wire2.htm. Access date: January 2011. 
[54] Weidong Xiang; Richardson, P.C.; Chenming Zhao; Mohammad, S.; , "Automobile 
Brake-by-Wire Control System Design and Analysis,"Vehicular Technology, IEEE 
Transactions on , vol.57, no.1, Jan 2008. 
[55] Auto Spectator. "Continental Steps Up Engineering on Electromechanical Brakes". 
Available: http://www.autospectator.com/cars/automotive-oems/0038720-
continental-steps-engineering-electromechanical-brakes. Access date: January 2011. 
[56] C. Wilwert, N. Navet, Y. Song, and F. Simonot-Lion, "Design of automotive X-by-Wire 
systems".  
[57] N. Storey, "Safety-Critical Computer Systems," in Fault Tolerance, 1st Edition, Addison 
Wesley, 1996. 
[58] International Organization for Standardization, "Road vehicles - Functional safety." 
[59] X-by-wire Consortium, "X-By-Wire: Safety Related Fault Tolerant Systems in Vehicles," 
November 1998. 
[60] H. Kirrmann, "Fault Tolerant Computing in Industrial Automation," in Fault-tolerant 
Computers, 2nd Edition, ABB Research Center, 2005. 
  
118 References 
 
 
 
 
[61] A. Goel and A. Sharma. "Dual core architectures in automotive SoCs". Available: 
http://www.eetimes.com/design/automotive-design/4206395/Dual-core-
architectures-in-automotive-SoCs?pageNumber=1. Access date: January 2011. 
[62] M. Baumeister, "Using Decoupled Parallel Mode for Safety Applications". Available: 
http://cache.freescale.com/files/32bit/doc/white_paper/MPC564XLWP.pdf. Access 
date: January 2011. 
[63] Freescale Semiconductor, "MPC5643L Microcontroller Data Sheet." 
